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SYMBOLIC RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION ON PUBLIC 
PROPERTY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTEGRITY 
OF RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS  
ANGELA C. CARMELLA*
ABSTRACT
When religious associations engage in symbolic expression, it matters whether they are 
on private property, in a public forum, or on closed government property. Only on private 
property and in public forums will the symbolic proclamations retain a connection with the 
speaker. When associations donate religious symbols to the state for display on closed 
government property, the state appropriates the symbols for its own purposes and as its own 
expression. In order for the display to comport with the current reading of the Establishment 
Clause, the government cannot adopt the religious message but must transform it into one 
that gives primacy to some civic or secular meaning. Government thus co-opts and dilutes 
the religious messages. Indeed, the mediating function of religious associations in society, 
which depend upon shared bonds of identity, purpose and expression, are weakened; 
tensions between church and state and between and among associations in society, necessary 
to this function, are relaxed. Other societal functions, such as limiting state power, are 
also threatened.  
 The symbols jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause, though often involving such 
donations, ignores these enervating impacts on donor associations and the wider 
implications for their significant societal functions. The Article discusses the need to 
coordinate laws relating to symbols on private property, in public forums, and in closed 
government spaces to protect the integrity of associations and their expression in a 
comprehensive way. It also considers the options of expanding public forums and of 
transferring public property into private hands as ways of protecting symbolic expression. 
This normative argument is drawn from the philosophical insights of both Catholic social 
theory and contemporary political theory. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION
 Religious exercise and land use are intimately connected. 
Religious associations in civil society and their members practice 
their faith in particular places, on particular pieces of real property. 
A visual survey of the built environment will reveal numerous and 
diverse houses of worship, religious schools, religiously adorned 
homes, and symbols of faith. All of these religious land uses are 
inherently expressive, because religious architecture and symbols are 
“semiotic” in nature—that is, they “function as signs, conveying 
cognitive and emotional meanings” to those who view them.
1
 The 
visual landscape thus conveys the message, in the most general 
sense, that religious associations are a persistently energetic 
presence in society.  
 But the particular messages that are conveyed will necessarily be 
indeterminate.
2
 Religious groups cannot control the meanings their 
symbols convey. Of course they may intend a particular meaning, but 
it is not possible to “fix” that meaning because viewers will interpret 
the symbol based on histories and contexts beyond the group’s 
control. The cross, for instance, conveys innumerable messages; its 
meaning varies even among Christians. Indeed, when the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars placed a large, white cross atop Sunrise Rock in a 
California desert in 1934, it intended to honor the war dead by 
evoking the image of military cemeteries with row upon row of white 
crosses.
3
 It did not intend to provide a site for Easter services for 
generations of Christian worshippers, which it unwittingly did.
4
 We 
can see the variety of meanings a symbol can generate when we 
consider how the Ku Klux Klan has used the cross as a symbol of 
racism for nearly a century. But when the Klan sought permission to 
display a cross on the plaza in front of the Ohio state house in 1993, 
the Supreme Court refused to view it as political expression and 
interpreted it instead as a traditional Christian symbol.
5
 Nor do religious groups “own” the symbols they use in worship 
and in their own sacred spaces. Quasi-religious and secular 
associations freely make use of religious symbols and texts. While 
many Christians and Jews revere the Ten Commandments as the 
 1. John J. Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformulation of the 
Dilemmas, 80 MICH. L. REV. 355, 392 (1982). 
 2. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1135-36 (2009) (noting that 
more than one meaning can be associated with a symbol and that such meanings can 
change over time and in different contexts). For a discussion of legal problems raised by 
attempts to own symbols and control their meaning, see generally David A. Simon, Register 
Trademarks and Keep the Faith: Trademarks, Religion and Identity, 49 IDEA 233 (2009). 
 3. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811 (2010). 
 4.  See id. at 1816. 
 5. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
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Word of God, consider the actions of the Fraternal Order of Eagles, a 
civic-minded, benevolent organization. It donated hundreds of Ten 
Commandments monuments to local and state governments all over 
the nation throughout the mid-twentieth century, believing that the 
moral message of the text would help fight juvenile delinquency.
6
Governments, too, have employed religious symbols and texts for 
civic and patriotic purposes for centuries.  
 Despite the fact that religious associations do not—indeed 
cannot—“own” the symbols they use or control the meaning they 
intend to convey, they know what they intend to express and will 
continue to proclaim their beliefs using symbols as a dimension of 
religious exercise.
7
 They may wish to transmit the core of the 
symbol’s message as it has been historically understood in a way 
understandable by this generation with an eye to passing it on to the 
next. Surely a cross may have innumerable meanings based on 
viewers’ perspectives, but most Christian communities all over the 
world will undoubtedly use it to express their specific unequivocal 
belief in salvation through Christ’s death and resurrection. This type 
of symbolic expression of religious identity and purpose are critical to 
the ongoing formation and practice of faith. As with any group, the 
promotion of group identity, purpose and expression have significant 
implications for the health of associations in civil society. In short, 
religious groups will create and re-create themselves using religious 
symbols, texts, and objects to convey their messages, not as 
owners of the symbols but as stewards, and they will do so regardless 
of how that particular message might be misperceived or challenged 
by viewers.  
 The location of a religious association’s symbolic expression will 
call for varying degrees of government involvement. When religious 
groups use their privately owned real property for symbolic 
expression, we typically assume that the intended “message” belongs 
to the group (even if the symbol does not belong to the group and the 
message cannot be controlled). We know, for instance, that a 
traditional nativity scene at Christmastime in front of a church is 
intended to celebrate the birth of a Savior. While a zoning ordinance 
might regulate the crèche’s size or placement, the church will be free 
to display this symbol on its own property. Similarly, when religious 
groups engage in symbolic expression within a government-owned 
public forum (like a park or plaza), we also assume that the intended 
“message” belongs to the group. So that same church, placing a 
crèche in the park along with a sign containing the sponsor’s name, 
 6. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682 (2005). 
 7. Architecture also involves proclamation of faith. See Angela C. Carmella, Houses 
of Worship and Religious Liberty: Constitutional Limits to Landmark Preservation and 
Architectural Review, 36 VILL. L. REV. 401 (1991) [hereinafter Carmella, Houses of Worship].
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tells the viewer that the church celebrates the birth of a Savior. And 
as long as the display comports with time, place, and manner 
regulations, the church is free to express itself symbolically since the 
private character of the speaker and the speech is preserved in such 
a forum.
8
 Further, a message can retain its integrity in public spaces 
where religious symbols have been placed spontaneously, without 
government knowledge or involvement, in what could be considered 
de facto public forums.
9
 That same church, placing a crèche on the 
broad median strip every year for sixty years without seeking 
anyone’s permission, is giving voice to its belief that a Savior is 
born.
10
 On private property and in independent public spaces, then, 
the symbolic expression—the intended proclamation—“belongs” to 
the religious association even if the symbol itself does not.  
 But if the church approaches the government in order to loan or 
donate the nativity scene for public display on government property 
that is not a public forum, everything changes.
11
 Religious groups in 
such situations likely think the expression continues to be theirs; 
they do not necessarily consider the implications of government 
acceptance of their symbols. But under Supreme Court doctrine, once 
the symbol is accepted, the message becomes government speech.
12
The state thereby appropriates the symbol for its own purposes and 
as its own expression on its own property. And in order for the display 
to comport with the current reading of the Establishment Clause, the 
government cannot support the church’s message that a Savior is 
born; it must change the message to one that gives primacy to some 
civic or secular meaning. Thus, the crèche must be contextualized 
among objects within a secular tableau so that its religious meaning 
is diminished—in essence, redefined to celebrate instead a season of 
goodwill.
13
 In my view, whether government endorses the church’s 
message or redefines it, the state’s acceptance and appropriation of 
the religious symbol threatens the donor’s independence, undermines 
the integrity of its religious expression, and further distorts 
interactions among religious associations and between those 
associations and the state.
14
 8. See infra notes 190-201 and accompanying text.  
 9. See infra notes 202-205 and accompanying text.  
 10. See Satawa v. Bd. of Cnty. Rd. Comm’rs, 687 F. Supp. 2d 682, 686-87 (E.D. Mich. 2009). 
 11. Because I am most concerned with the impact on donor groups and others that 
share the donor’s meaning, this Article does not focus on situations in which government 
officials themselves create the religious display, as in McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 
844 (2005) (Ten Commandments displays in courthouse). 
 12. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129 (2009). 
 13. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984). 
 14. See infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text. Some might reject the notion that a 
religious group’s symbolic message can be converted into a different (secular or civic) 
message for government’s own purposes. In other words, one might say a crèche or 
menorah will always have a religious meaning regardless of the state’s (or a court’s) 
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 These dangers exist primarily in connection with theologically 
significant symbols that are part of the active life of religious 
organizations like crèches, menorahs, crosses, and Ten 
Commandments displays.
15
 Indeed, when the religious organization 
Chabad placed a menorah on the steps of the City-County Building in 
Pittsburgh more than twenty years ago, it thought that the space 
was a public forum to which it had a right of access; it vigorously 
opposed the view that its menorah was somehow part of government 
expression. But the Supreme Court in Allegheny County v. American 
Civil Liberties Union
16
 found the menorah, as it was situated next to 
a Christmas tree and sign saluting liberty, to be part of the 
government’s secular message of pluralism. Had the Court found the 
location to serve the expressive purposes of an open forum, the 
message conveyed would have been Chabad’s undeniably religious 
message, and there would have been no need for state involvement in 
the content of that message, no need to transform it from a message 
commemorating a miracle to a message celebrating American 
pluralism. The integrity of the religious association and its 
expression would have been maintained.   
characterization of its meaning. Others might accept that a donated symbol can be 
converted for the government’s communicative purposes but think this is reasonable as 
long as religious groups still have their private and public forum spaces in which to express 
their messages. But these questions are inapposite to my concerns, which focus on the 
resulting church-state relationship between government and the donor religious groups. In 
short, “religious believers should not look to the state as a surrogate for their own efforts to 
get religious messages into public life.” E. Gregory Wallace, When Government Speaks 
Religiously, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1183, 1256 (1994) (noting that government uses 
religious symbols for furthering political agendas, and that such use may corrupt 
theological meaning). 
 15. The discussion in this Article centers on religious symbols in the life and 
expression of mediating associations and argues for an Establishment Clause 
interpretation that protects associational vibrancy in civil society. I have focused on 
symbols like crèches, menorahs, crosses, and Ten Commandments displays. These are 
specifically contrasted with civic symbols that contain religious elements, as I do not 
believe that government use of these symbols creates any harmful relationship between 
mediating groups and the state. It does not compromise their identity and purpose, nor 
does it dilute their messages. Even the Liberty Bell in Philadelphia contains an inscription 
from the book of Leviticus: “Proclaim Liberty throughout all the Land unto all the 
Inhabitants thereof. Lev. XXV X.” Brief of International Municipal Lawyers Ass’n as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 18-19 & n.10, Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 
(2010) (No. 08-472) (quoting Leviticus 25:10) (internal quotation marks omitted). These are 
not the kinds of symbolic expression the Religion Clauses should address. The Court 
recognizes, albeit awkwardly, that there are categories of governmental use of religion that 
fall outside the normal proscriptions of the Clause. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 33, 36-37 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (finding “under God” in 
pledge of allegiance to be an example of ceremonial deism); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668, 687, 692-93 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting ubiquity and history of 
government acknowledgements of religion that serve secular purpose of solemnizing 
public occasions).  
 16. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).  
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 This Article focuses on the church-state relationship that results 
from situations in which religious groups seek to loan or donate their 
symbols for display on public property and on the broader societal 
harms that occur. Once the state adopts a particular theologically 
significant symbol, tensions necessary to the mediating function of 
groups in civil society are relaxed.
17
 One religious group now has 
state power behind its symbolic expression, which corrodes the 
necessary distinction between state and church, threatening a 
collapse of identity and voice and destroying the independence of the 
association. Obviously, once one religious message is privileged, the 
tensions are broken that would otherwise sustain open access for 
multiple voices to independent public spaces. Further, the interaction 
among religious associations in society becomes distorted, because 
the state has appropriated the voice of one and not others, thereby 
threatening the mediating role for all groups—those who share the 
symbol and those who do not.  
 The appropriation of religious messages also threatens another 
important function of religious groups: limiting the state and 
maintaining the boundary between civil society and the state.
18
Religious groups limit the state not only by their existence but also 
by prophetic critique of the state and its authoritarian tendencies.
19
Government co-optation of the messages of some religious groups 
practically ensures that they will be less vibrant messengers in 
society, making it much harder for them to be critical of government. 
Thus, the protection of religious identity, purpose, and expression 
becomes harder to achieve in the context of closed government 
spaces, where government’s management of its property easily 
dilutes the meaning of theologically significant symbols and 
enervates the religious associations that steward those symbols.  
 In the symbols jurisprudence, the Court misses an opportunity to 
attend to the importance of mediating associations. Many of the cases 
involve government acceptance and appropriation of symbols that 
groups have donated for temporary or permanent display. Yet 
instead of focusing on those donors and the resulting church-state 
relationship and societal implications, the Court gives primary 
consideration to a symbol’s meaning in a given context. This futile 
attempt to “fix” what is indeterminate produces an abstruse and 
fractured jurisprudence: one crèche is constitutional, while another is 
 17. See infra Part II.B.  
 18. See, e.g., Angela C. Carmella, Responsible Freedom under the Religion Clauses: 
Exemptions, Legal Pluralism, and the Common Good, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 403, 409-12 
(2007) [hereinafter Carmella, Exemptions].
 19. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State 
Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385 (2004). 
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not;
20
 this Ten Commandments display is constitutional, but that one 
is not;
21
 one cross is constitutional, another is not.
22
 It may be true 
that many members of the Court have recognized negative impacts of 
government use of religious symbolism of one sort or another: for 
instance, it is commonly noted that members of minority faiths or no 
faith at all will feel excluded, or that those who share the faith will 
feel offended. Yet no one on the Court specifically engages the issue 
of harm to the independence and integrity of religious associations 
(and their messages) when government promotes the very same 
message, or uses the same symbol to promote a different one. The 
Court fails to appreciate the extent to which such governmental use 
of religious symbols distorts the relationships between and among 
varying and often competing associations within civil society, and 
thus, the Court changes the terms of the relationships between these 
groups, their members, and the state.
23
  My normative position, as I have expressed it in a series of 
articles, is drawn from the philosophical insights of both Catholic 
social theory and constitutional jurisprudence.
24
 This Article focuses 
on the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence as it 
concerns religious groups that seek to express themselves through 
symbols on public property. As for private property, I have argued 
elsewhere against restrictions on responsible religious land use and 
symbolism, whether by governmental zoning and preservation
25
 or 
private rules of condominium and homeowner associations.
26
 In those 
articles, I noted that restrictions on religious exercise on public 
property have made private property the primary locus for religious 
exercise. In this Article, I provide a normative rationale for those 
restrictions where symbols are donated for display in closed, 
government-controlled spaces. In such situations, the state is overly 
involved in interpreting and revising the content of the symbolic 
expression of religious associations. But in public forums, by 
 20. Compare Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) with Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 
492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 21. Compare Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) with McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 
545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
 22. Compare Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) 
with Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1813 (2010) (acknowledging Buono v. Norton, 371 
F.3d 543, 549-50 (9th Cir. 2004)).  
 23. See infra notes 181-183 and accompanying text. 
 24. See Angela C. Carmella, RLUIPA: Linking Religion, Land Use, Ownership and the 
Common Good, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 485 (2009) [hereinafter Carmella, RLUIPA]; Angela 
C. Carmella, Religion-Free Environments in Common Interest Communities, 38 PEPP. L.
REV. 57 ( 2010) [hereinafter Carmella, Religion-Free Environments].
 25. Carmella, Houses of Worship, supra note 7; Carmella, RLUIPA, supra note 24.  
 26. Carmella, Religion-Free Environments, supra note 24. 
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contrast, the state is only minimally involved and associations are 
able to retain their identity and voice.
27
 Focusing on the associational health of religious associations 
allows us to connect developments across different areas of law and 
create a more holistic and balanced approach to associational 
expression on private and public property. Currently, the lack of 
coordination is starkly apparent.
28
 A religious group might not be 
able to build a house of worship on property it owns (because of 
zoning controls), or rent space in the public library for worship 
(because of public forum restrictions); some of its members living in a 
subdivision might not be able to affix religious symbols to their 
houses (because of homeowner association rules); but the group 
might be able to donate a symbol of its faith to a local government for 
display in front of the municipal building (provided it is placed 
alongside other symbols that sufficiently diminish the religious 
content of the message). Such a lack of coordination produces an 
inversion of commonly held expectations regarding private and public 
property. It is time to coordinate these areas of law to protect 
associations and individuals in their expressive freedoms, 
particularly on private property and in broadly defined independent 
public spaces like public forums.  
  The Article is organized as follows. Part II provides a description 
of responsible freedom for religious associations, a theme I have 
developed elsewhere,
29
 particularly as those groups mediate between 
individuals and the state. I emphasize that important tensions 
between state and nonstate actors sustain both liberty and order. I 
make the argument that the government’s acceptance and 
appropriation of theologically significant symbols is harmful to 
religious associations because it reduces those tensions and 
compromises their mediating functions. Part III documents the 
 27. By focusing on the relationship between government and religious associations, 
we see that independent public spaces, like public forums, do not involve government in 
religious symbolic expression. In traditional and designated public forums, religious 
messages are treated on par with nonreligious speech. Within the public forum, the state 
does not embrace the speaker’s message or threaten to absorb the speaker’s identity as can 
happen when government promotes the group’s message or appropriates it as its own. 
 28. See infra Part III.C. Severe land use controls on the building of houses of worship 
and other religious uses prompted Congress in 2000 to pass protective federal legislation 
for private owners, yet some courts continue to condone unwarranted restrictions. 
Additionally, private restrictions on residential property have become more prevalent, with 
condominium and homeowner association covenants impeding religious uses and 
placement of symbols. Further, some restrictions on religious use in public spaces 
(otherwise available for private uses) have been found acceptable under the public forum 
doctrine. In remarkable contrast, the law is far more amenable to the display of 
theologically significant symbols on public property. 
 29. See, e.g., Angela C. Carmella, The Protection of Children and Young People: 
Catholic and Constitutional Visions of Responsible Freedom, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1031 (2003); 
Carmella, Exemptions, supra note 18. 
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inadequate attention given to religious associations in the Court’s 
religious symbols jurisprudence, as well as the additional problems 
created by the Court’s flawed understanding of what renders a public 
display of theologically significant symbols constitutional. The 
section also notes the lack of coordination among bodies of law 
governing private, public forum, and public property, which prevents 
the development of a comprehensive vision for protecting the 
mediating function of religious associations in civil society. Part IV 
discusses the most recent Supreme Court decision concerning 
religious symbols, Salazar v. Buono,
30
 and assesses practical 
remedies—the creation of public forums and, at issue in Salazar, the 
transfer of public property into private hands—that protect 
expressive association.  
II.  RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR ASSOCIATIONS (AND THEIR MESSAGES) IN 
CIVIL SOCIETY
 The Supreme Court unanimously agrees in principle that there 
are constitutional limits to religious symbolism on public property. 
But those limits are nevertheless highly contested. Some on the 
Court read the Establishment Clause to forbid only those religious 
displays characterized by coercion or proselytization,
31
 or that are 
narrowly “sectarian.”
32
 Some read it to create a presumption against 
any religious symbol on any government property, even in public 
forums and even on private property formerly owned by the 
government.
33
 One justice has offered an approach based on the 
exercise of “legal judgment,” which seems to involve a balancing of 
relevant factors.
34
 Others have employed the “endorsement test” to 
disallow any display that would make religion relevant to a citizen’s 
standing in the political community, in the eyes of a “reasonable 
observer.” This endorsement inquiry asks whether the symbolic 
expression “sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, 
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying 
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the 
political community.”
35
 While political equality and civic peace are commonly noted 
justifications for restricting religious symbolism on governmental 
property, the most compelling reason in my view is really quite 
 30. 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010). 
 31. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659-60 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 32. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 868 (2005). 
 33. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 797 (1995) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1828 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 34. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 35. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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simple: to preserve religious freedom primarily for religious 
associations that steward those symbols and, derivatively, for the 
individuals who value them. State adoption of theologically 
significant symbols as its own expression on its own property 
threatens the independence of religious groups in society and 
compromises their messages. Restraint on the part of government is 
required as an outgrowth of our overarching constitutional design of 
limited government, which acknowledges a “private”
36
 sphere—that 
is, civil society—in which nonstate actors and private property play a 
critical mediating role between the individual and the state.
37
 Indeed, 
the Court has noted that “[t]he design of the Constitution is that 
preservation and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a 
responsibility and a choice committed to the private sphere, which 
itself is promised freedom to pursue that mission.”
38
 Under this 
constitutional design, government is disabled in a particular way 
with respect to religion: the state is not competent to determine 
religious truth, to espouse religious teachings, or to set up or affiliate 
with a church. If it could do these things, religious freedom in a 
vastly pluralistic society like ours would be illusory.  
 While government restraint guarantees freedom in that “private 
sphere,” the responsibility for religious exercise falls squarely on 
nonstate actors in civil society—such as families and religious 
associations (i.e., religious institutions and less formalized religious 
groups)—to undertake religious activities, including theologically 
meaningful land use. And it is obvious that when these groups give 
voice to their faith through the display of symbols, objects, and texts, 
they do so primarily on their own property, at their homes, and at 
religious buildings, as well as in independent public spaces like 
public forums, where the expression can be fully their own.
39
 But 
when religious associations ask the state to approve and adopt their 
symbols for placement on public property, religious identity and 
expression are deeply compromised. Indeed, when government 
accepts theologically significant symbols for display on its own 
property, it appropriates those symbols as its own speech for its own 
purposes, which fundamentally dilutes and alters their religious 
 36. In this Article, “private” means nongovernmental. It does not mean activity that is 
hidden from public view.  
 37. See generally SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE: SOURCES OF COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AND 
CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (Mary Ann Glendon & David Blankenhorn eds., 1995) 
[hereinafter SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE].
 38. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992).  
 39. Most religious associations in the United States own their own property. See
Angela C. Carmella, Land Use Regulation of Churches, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF IDENTITY, LIBERTY, AND THE LAW 565, 566-67 (James  
A. Serritella et al. eds., 2006).
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meaning and threatens the mediating function performed by 
religious associations in civil society. 
 The Court does not acknowledge these kinds of impacts on religious 
groups when it analyzes religious symbols on public property. 
Instead, its various members provide their own perspectives on 
religious freedom. The justices who are more amenable to religion on 
public property view such displays as a dimension of religious 
freedom, noting that the presence of nonsectarian symbolism simply 
accommodates the religiosity of the citizenry.
40
 The justices who 
staunchly oppose religious symbols on public property do so, in part, 
on the assumption that religious groups and citizens have sufficient 
alternative outlets for expression at their privately owned homes and 
houses of worship.
41
 And those who use the endorsement test regard 
the religious groups whose symbols are adopted as “insiders” unfairly 
benefited by government privilege; they focus their concern on those 
who do not share the symbols and who suffer the ostracizing effects 
of the display.
42
 But no one on the Court ever squarely considers the 
possibility of negative impacts on the religious actors—those 
insiders—who steward the symbols.
43
 40. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 663 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in judgment, dissenting in part) (Religious symbols “fall[ ]well within the 
tradition of government accommodation and acknowledgment of religion that has marked 
our history from the beginning.”). 
 41. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 707, 735 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(Religious symbols can be “displayed in front of Protestant churches, benevolent 
organizations’ meeting places, or on the front lawns of private citizens” but not on 
“property that is located on the government side of the metaphorical wall.”). 
 42. Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 626 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (The crèche “conveys 
a message to nonadherents of Christianity that they are not full members of the political 
community, and a corresponding message to Christians that they are favored members of 
the political community.”). 
 43. One category of cases, the Native American lands cases, does acknowledge the 
severity of the impacts on tribal free exercise. See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (road through sacred lands would destroy religion, 
but no cognizable burden exists for constitutional purposes because no coercion is involved; 
Native Americans still have access to sacred sites). Though this Article focuses only on 
religious objects that are placed on public lands, as opposed to public lands that are 
themselves sacred to the group, the Native American situation is instructive. Though 
Native Americans have access to their sites, “those rights do not divest the Government of 
its right to use what is, after all, its land.” Id. at 453 (emphasis in original). The disregard 
shown the Native Americans suggests a similar attitude in the symbols cases: government 
will use the symbols for its own semiotic purposes on what is, after all, its own land. 
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A.  Respect for Shared Identity, Purpose, and Expression: Protecting 
the Mediating Role of Religious Associations 
 The distinction between civil society and the state is central to 
contemporary political theory,
44
 as well as to the Catholic intellectual 
tradition which shapes my normative vision of the person, state, and 
society.
45
 In this tradition, religious freedom is grounded in the 
dignity of the human person
46
 who is, by nature, fundamentally 
social, “intelligent, reasonable, . . . responsible . . . . and situated.”
47
Indeed, the person is “situated” in a thick web of multiple and varied 
nonstate social groups—families, neighborhoods, religious 
communities, work-related organizations, cultural groups, voluntary 
associations of all kinds, and market actors; many of these groups 
“mediate” between the person and the state. Together these social 
groups constitute a vibrant, pluralistic civic sphere and are 
responsible for promoting the common good—that is, the set of social 
conditions that facilitate human flourishing, enabling each person to 
“achieve the fullness of his own being.”
48
 In contrast to civil society, the state (through law) plays a more 
defined and subsidiary (albeit critical) role in protecting human 
dignity and freedom.
49
 The state’s main task is to ensure a piece of 
the common good known as the public order—protecting civil rights, 
public peace, and public morality. The state is also charged with the 
 44. See Nancy L. Rosenblum & Robert C. Post, Introduction, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND 
GOVERNMENT 1, 1 (Nancy L. Rosenblum & Robert C. Post eds., 2002) [hereinafter 
Rosenblum & Post, Introduction].
 45. See generally Angela C. Carmella, A Catholic View of Law and Justice, in CHRISTIAN 
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 255 (Michael W. McConnell, Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & 
Angela C. Carmella eds., 2001) [hereinafter Carmella, CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES].
 46. Declaration on Religious Freedom, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 675 (Walter 
M. Abbott, S.J., ed., 1966) [hereinafter Declaration]. As Pope John XXIII declared, the 
person is the subject, foundation, and end of the entire social life. Pacem in Terris, in
RENEWING THE EARTH: CATHOLIC DOCUMENTS ON PEACE, JUSTICE AND LIBERATION 124, 
130 (David J. O’Brien & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1977). Twentieth century papal 
encyclicals and church statements have declared repeatedly that the person is the subject, 
foundation, and end of the social order. See, e.g., id.; see also Gregory Kalscheur, S.J., 
Moral Limits on Morals Legislation: Lessons for U.S. Constitutional Law from the 
Declaration on Religious Freedom, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 28 (2006) (“The right to 
religious freedom articulated by the Council is rooted in a commitment to respect the 
exercise of responsible freedom that is demanded by human dignity.”). 
 47. Thomas C. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work: Unions as Seedbeds of the Civic Virtues,
in SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE, supra note 37, at 131, 155.  
 48. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS 
ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 328 (1960). For discussion of the various approaches to the 
common good, religious and philosophical, see ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE 
COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE 104-18 (2010) 
[hereinafter VISCHER, CONSCIENCE]; Michael W. McConnell, Believers as Equal Citizens, in 
OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN 
PLURALIST DEMOCRACIES 90 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000). 
 49. See generally Kalscheur, supra note 46. 
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task of coordinating and assisting nonstate actors in their promotion 
of the common good but must do so without assuming or absorbing 
the independent functions of these actors.
50
 This is a model of 
“subsidiarity,” in which the state respects the independence and 
integrity of the associations within civil society and encourages, in 
conditions of freedom, the vitality and energy of collaborative 
endeavors between and among state and nonstate actors. 
Government is limited so that it cannot usurp the proper roles of the 
institutions of civil society, but it remains activist and moral, 
involved in a wide range of concerns within its public order 
function.
51
 Indeed, the state must be quite heavily involved, as “the 
common good requires a level of social justice and order that only 
state authority can ensure.”
52
 Given the multiplicity of associations, civil society is characterized 
by “plural and particularist identities,”
53
 among them mediating 
associations which are “essential to social stability, to a prudently 
limited state, and to the prospects for human flourishing.”
54
 They 
mediate between the person and the state by gathering people of 
 50. See, e.g., John A. Coleman, A Limited State and a Vibrant Society: Christianity 
and Civil Society, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 44, at 223, 238-42; 
Carmella, Exemptions, supra note 18, at 407-08, 443-44.  
 51. See generally Carmella, Exemptions, supra note 18, at 442-47; VISCHER,
CONSCIENCE, supra note 48, at 104-05 (“Subsidiarity is . . . premised on the empowerment 
of individuals and groups to meet the needs around them, with the state acting, not as the 
primary locus of social action, but in a supportive, secondary role. This dispersal of social 
authority represents the ‘bottom up’ ordering of society in which needs are met, where 
possible, by the moral agents who are closest to them. . . . Only if the lower bodies cannot 
address a problem effectively should the higher bodies step in.”). John Courtney Murray 
and Jacques Maritain both thought the state-society distinction and subsidiarity (in the 
form of constitutional democracy and religious freedom) protected against totalitarianism. 
Angela C. Carmella, Commentary: John Courtney Murray, S.J. (1904-1967), in THE 
TEACHINGS OF MODERN ROMAN CATHOLICISM ON LAW, POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 181, 
189, 192-94 (John Witte Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2007) [hereinafter Carmella, John 
Courtney Murray].
 52. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE, supra note 48, at 103. John Courtney Murray 
noted that
government, strictly speaking, creates nothing, that its function is to order, not 
to create. Perhaps more exactly, its function is to create the conditions of order 
under which original vitalities and forces, present in society, may have full 
scope to create the values by which society lives. Perhaps still more exactly, the 
only value which government per se is called upon to create is the value of 
order. But the value of order resides primarily in the fact that it furnishes 
[opportunities] for the exercise of . . . freedoms.  
Carmella, John Courtney Murray, supra note 51, at 190 (quoting JOHN COURTNEY 
MURRAY, Leo XIII and Pius XII: Government and the Order of Religion, in RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY: CATHOLIC STRUGGLES WITH PLURALISM 49, 78 (J. Leon Hooper, S.J. ed., 1993) 
[hereinafter RELIGIOUS LIBERTY]).  
 53. Rosenblum & Post, Introduction, supra note 44, at 3. 
 54. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE, supra note 48, at 101; see also Nancy L. Rosenblum, Amos:
Religious Autonomy and the Moral Uses of Pluralism, in OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND 
DEMANDS OF FAITH, supra note 48, at 165 [hereinafter Rosenblum, Religious Autonomy].
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shared values and views into a common identity, common voice, and 
common purpose, often one “shaped by members’ shared dictates of 
conscience.”
55
 Religious associations play a particularly strong 
mediating role by providing these shared bonds of identity, 
expression, and purpose. As the Second Vatican Council’s Declaration 
on Religious Freedom recognized, “the social nature of man itself 
requires that he should give external expression to his internal acts of 
religion; that he should participate with others in matters religious;
that he should profess his religion in community.”
56
 Thus, for both 
religious and nonreligious associational life, the common bonds 
“empower[] citizens . . . to participate in projects that are bigger than 
themselves—a hallmark of a vibrant civil society.”
57
 The state’s public order role will often place it in deep tension with 
associations in civil society, especially as government owes citizens a 
commitment to overarching public norms. Obviously, these tensions 
are required to ensure the balancing of freedom and responsibility, 
action and stability, diversity and order. The state cannot allow 
religious groups unfettered latitude; indeed, limits are often 
necessary for the preservation of their mediating role.
58
 On the other 
hand, the state cannot act in ways that crush or absorb associations, 
or act in ways that so compromise identity, purpose, or expression as 
to remake the group in the state’s image. As it plays out in law, we 
see that a group’s shared bonds will always be in tension with the 
state to some degree. For instance, as to identity and autonomy, the 
right to exclude is not absolute. And as to purpose, access to 
resources for public-private projects can be conditioned. In the 
expressive context, the right of access to independent public spaces 
for the expression of views does not include privileged access or state 
promotion of one’s message. The relationship between state and 
nonstate actors is thus characterized by numerous tensions that 
promote associational diversity while maintaining the boundary 
between society and the state: nonstate groups, especially those with 
important mediating functions, are neither unaccountable nor 
captive to the state; the state is neither powerless nor omnipotent in 
its relation to groups; and individuals are neither subjugated to 
groups nor superior to them.
59
 55. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE, supra note 48, at 138. He proposes these “three mediating 
‘values’ that allow voluntary associations to serve as bridges between the individual and 
the state and that capture the essence of the benefits derived from associations by 
individual participants and the surrounding society.” Id. at 126. 
 56. Declaration, supra note 46, at 681 (emphasis added). 
 57. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE, supra note 48, at 103-04.  
 58. See generally Rosenblum, Religious Autonomy, supra note 54.
 59. See generally VISCHER, CONSCIENCE, supra note 48, at 127-51 for examples of 
tensions in each of the three mediating values. While Professor Vischer focuses on those 
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 These tensions are absolutely necessary with regard to religious 
freedom, where the independence of religious associations from the 
state is a constitutional norm. Indeed, the distinction between church 
and state is a hallmark of American political structure. Government’s 
primary role in relation to religious associations is to protect 
responsible religious exercise.
60
 It is not within the state’s public 
ordering function to create vibrant religious life; that can only be 
done, if at all, by the associations within civil society, that realm of 
the particular and plural.
61
 The state has no theological function or 
sovereignty, is incompetent in matters of religious truth, and 
promotes no religious ideal or religious unity. It is a political 
sovereign with political function, promoting a civil unity through 
law;
62
 and though it is a moral actor, the state is nonsacral.
63
 The 
groups with controversial norms, it is clear that tensions exist even for groups with 
considerable overlap with public norms that are widely shared.  
 60. Declaration, supra note 46, at 687 (stating that the state’s role is to ensure 
freedom “as far as possible, and curtailed only when and in so far as necessary”). As John 
Courtney Murray wrote, “The state [is] ‘competent to do only one thing in respect of 
religion, that is, to recognize, guarantee, protect, and promote the religious freedom of the 
people. This is the full extent of [its] competence.’ ” Carmella, John Courtney Murray, 
supra note 51, at 194-95 (quoting RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 52, at 152). In contrast, 
“the care of religion, in so far as religion is an integral element of the common good of 
society, devolves upon those institutions whose purposes are religious.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 61. As John Courtney Murray explained, “It is religion itself, not government, which 
has the function of making society religious. The conditions favorable to the fulfillment of 
this function are conditions of freedom.” Carmella, John Courtney Murray, supra note 51, 
at 205 (quoting John Courtney Murray, S.J., The Issue of Church and State at Vatican 
Council II, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 52, at 216-17). The Supreme Court has 
echoed this sentiment:
Under our constitutional scheme, the role of safeguarding our “religious 
heritage” and of promoting religious beliefs is reserved as the exclusive 
prerogative of our Nation’s churches, religious institutions, and spiritual 
leaders. Because the Framers of the Establishment Clause understood that 
“religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy to permit its unhallowed 
perversion by civil [authorities],” the Clause demands that government play no 
role in this effort.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 725 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
 62. Civil unity is established “by the rule of law . . . and by the rule of law that serves 
as a framework for the orderly pursuit of a common good.” Carmella, John Courtney 
Murray, supra note 51, at 225 (quoting JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, The Return to Tribalism,
in BRIDGING THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR: SELECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN COURTNEY 
MURRAY, S.J. 151-54 (J. Leon Hooper ed., 1993) [hereinafter BRIDGING THE SACRED AND 
THE SECULAR]). 
 63.  See Carmella, John Courtney Murray, supra note 51, at 235 (“ ‘The function [of 
the state] is secular because freedom in society . . . remains a secular value—the sort of 
value that government can protect and foster by the instrument of law. Moreover, to this 
conception of the state as secular, there corresponds a conception of society itself as secular 
. . . . [I]n the secular society, under the secular state, the highest value that both state and 
society are called upon to protect and foster is the personal and social value of the free 
exercise of religion.’ ” (quoting John Courtney Murray, The Declaration on Religious 
Freedom, in BRIDGING THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR, supra note 62, at 192-93, 196)).  
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Religion Clauses themselves are what Jesuit philosopher and 
theologian John Courtney Murray called articles of peace, not articles 
of faith. They are intended to work together to protect religious 
freedom. “[T]hey ‘have no religious content. They answer none of the 
eternal human questions with regard to the nature of truth and 
freedom or the manner in which the spiritual order of man’s life is to 
be organized or not organized.’ ”
64
 The clauses deprive the state of 
religious authority and opinion and provide a framework of law to 
protect religious freedom. 
 Indeed, the vibrancy of religious life in civil society depends on 
conditions of freedom, not on government support or promotion. 
While the state generally plays an important role in coordinating and 
assisting the groups of civil society as they promote the common 
good, the state “assists” religious associations primarily through 
protection of religious exercise.
65
 Many kinds of “help” actually 
undermine the integrity of religious groups; recall that the Founders 
rejected an established church—funded by the state, with clergy 
appointed by the state and liturgy approved by the state—on the 
grounds that it impeded the religious freedom of churches as well as 
individuals. This insight has historical antecedents in a long line of 
evangelical and pietistic separationists, beginning with Roger 
Williams in the seventeenth century, who were passionately 
concerned that state involvement in religious affairs would corrupt 
religion.
66
 Indeed, such an understanding was critical to the passage 
of the First Amendment. The separationists understood that the 
necessary tensions between church and state, which enable religious 
groups to function independently within a structure of temporal laws, 
would be relaxed in dangerous ways under an established church.  
 But in our complex legal and social world, maintaining these 
tensions to ensure religious freedom requires more than just 
“separation”—it requires that religious groups and the state remain 
in a relationship, but one that does not threaten the religious 
association’s mediating role and the shared bonds of identity, 
purpose, and expression that characterize that role. The state is 
limited, moral, and activist, and not simply an umpire or enforcer. 
Deciding the appropriate contours of the relationship on any given 
topic has become a major task of constitutional and statutory 
 64. Id. at 195 (quoting MURRAY, supra note 48, at 49). 
 65. The Declaration counsels that government should “show [religion] favor.” 
Declaration, supra note 46, at 680-81 ¶ 3. I adopt John Courtney Murray’s interpretation of 
this language: a nation “shows religion favor” by protecting its exercise by associations and 
individuals. Obviously in the U.S. there are many ways we show religion favor, as with 
religious exemptions from general laws, but they must always be connected to the 
promotion of religious freedom. See generally Carmella, Exemptions, supra note 18.  
 66. See generally ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES (1990). 
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interpretation, where questions persist regarding whether religious 
conduct should sometimes be exempt from laws otherwise applicable 
to others, whether funding for education and social services should be 
available to religious groups and if so, on what conditions, and 
whether religious expression should be excluded from certain public 
spaces. Focusing on separation alone, rather than on real threats to 
the integrity of religious associations, is misguided and can easily 
result in hostility toward religion.  
B.  State Appropriation of Theologically Significant Symbols: 
Threatening the Mediating Role of Religious Associations 
 Given my normative argument in favor of free exercise for 
religious groups and their members, my analysis of religious land use 
considers whether the church-state relationship promotes or 
threatens the mediating function of those groups. This question is 
relevant to religious use and symbolism on different kinds of 
property, private and public, because the church-state relationship 
should not harm the shared bonds of associational life or weaken the 
necessary tensions that promote it. Were we to focus only on the 
types of property, one might argue that religious land use and 
symbolism must belong on both private and public property because 
public property represents, and therefore should reflect, a citizenry 
that cherishes religious freedom and embraces many religious 
traditions. Others might argue instead that religion, as a dimension 
of the plural and particular of civil society, belongs only on private 
property and not on public property, which must be devoted to 
inclusive, secular norms. But in my view the analysis must be 
directed not simply to the nature of the property but also to the 
nature of the relationship between religious associations and the 
state. The mediating function of social groups is best preserved on 
private property and in independent public spaces like public forums 
because the government’s involvement in their symbolic expression is 
circumscribed by law in those locations.
67
 Especially in connection 
with theologically significant objects—those used for sacral or 
devotional purposes—the freedom to give symbolic voice to one’s 
beliefs on one’s own property or within a public forum is a 
fundamental aspect of both free exercise and free speech.  
 Private property, which provides “a setting within which 
individuals can exercise liberties . . . such as free speech, religious 
activity, and private family life, without undue government 
 67. This of course does not mean that government has no relationship to owners of 
private property or users of public forums. But in those contexts, there is an understanding 
that religious associations enjoy constitutional and statutory protections that restrain 
government regulation and that structure the relationship.  
498 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:481 
interference,”
68
 has long been the primary locus for religious identity, 
purpose, and expression and has helped assure a degree of 
independence from the state when it comes to particular 
architectural statements and symbolism. Earlier in our history, 
religious property use was widely understood to be a dimension of 
religious exercise, but as land use controls have become more 
pervasive and as accountability in land use choices has grown, it has 
become necessary to make that connection explicit.
69
 Houses of 
worship and other institutional religious land uses, as well as 
religious uses of residences, now receive some significant protections 
under various federal and state statutes and constitutions.
70
Symbolic religious expression on private property receives some legal 
protection as well.
71
 Indeed, courts and land use authorities are 
beginning to grasp the deeply semiotic function of religious 
architecture and religious symbols.
72
 So even though some major 
obstacles remain and a more consistent and comprehensive 
 68. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 23 (2000). 
As an institution of civil society, private property should promote the common good, 
creating and supporting the social, economic, and political conditions that enable human 
development and flourishing. Property “secures individual autonomy from government 
coercion, prevents an over-concentration of political authority generally, and encourages 
investment and economic development.” Douglas W. Kmiec, Property and Economic Liberty 
as Civil Rights: The Magisterial History of James W. Ely, Jr., 52 VAND. L. REV. 737, 737 
(1999) (book review). 
[P]roperty is itself merely a means to the protection of person and family and 
the freedom associated with both family life and economic initiative. . . . The 
private nature of property is protected not because ownership is a good in itself, 
but because it fulfills higher goods, including: the security against theft, civil 
disorder, and violence; the incentive to work and to find worth in that work and 
the efforts of others; and the development of neighborhoods that fulfill a deep 
and natural human yearning for community in both a social and political sense. 
Id. at 753. 
 69. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-
5(7)(B) (2006) (“The use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious 
exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise of the person or entity that uses or 
intends to use the property for that purpose.”); Carmella, RLUIPA, supra note 24, at 491-503. 
 70. See generally Carmella, RLUIPA, supra note 24; Carmella, Religion-Free 
Environments, supra note 24, at 99-102. 
 71. See generally Carmella, Houses of Worship, supra note 7; Carmella, Religion-Free 
Environments, supra note 24. See also City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994), in which 
the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that prohibited signs on one’s property as a 
violation of the Free Speech Clause. Id. at 58 (“A special respect for individual liberty in 
the home has long been part of our culture and our law; that principle has special 
resonance when the government seeks to constrain a person’s ability to speak there.” 
(internal citations omitted)). But size restrictions generally are permissible. See, e.g.,
Trinity Assembly of God of Baltimore City, Inc. v. People’s Counsel for Baltimore Cnty., 
962 A.2d 404 (Md. 2008); St. John’s Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Ellisville, 122 
S.W.3d 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); Spriggs v. S. Stabane Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 786 A.2d 
333 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).  
 72. See, e.g., E. Bay Asian Local Dev’t Corp. v. State, 13 P.3d 1122 (Cal. 2000); First 
Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992); Soc’y of Jesus v. Boston 
Landmarks Comm’n, 564 N.Ed.2d 571 (Mass. 1990).  
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commitment to these values is needed, there is some recognition 
that the state should not have an exclusively aesthetic interest in 
the design of religious buildings and objects actively used by 
religious communities.
73
 Religious exercise and expression of associations and individuals 
also occur on public property, historically located in spaces open to 
private speech known as “public forums.” Indeed, because the speech 
remains the expression of the entrant into the forum, identity, 
purpose, and voice are maintained. Such independent public spaces 
include the traditional public forum, like a park or plaza, and the 
specifically designated one, as when public facilities are made 
available to a wide range of groups for particular purposes.
74
Religious gatherings in traditional forums have a long history: in 
reaction to local government efforts to close public spaces to religious 
speakers, the Supreme Court made clear in a series of decisions in 
the 1940s and 50s that religious groups “were entitled to use city 
streets and parks for meetings and rallies” and for the distribution of 
religious literature.
75
 In recent decades, governments again sought to 
close public spaces to religious speakers, this time in connection with 
designated forums. But the Court has been particularly active in 
defining the rights of religious groups to equal access to these spaces. 
Most cases involve transient uses of public space (holding meetings 
on a state university’s campus
76
 and in public school facilities during 
nonschool hours
77
), but free-standing temporary displays of religious 
symbols have also been upheld.
78
 Recently, however, the Court 
agreed with local governments that even though a public park serves 
as a traditional forum for transient speech, it does not necessarily 
serve as a forum for permanent monuments, in recognition of the 
practical difficulties of limited space.
79
 73. See cases cited supra note 72.
 74. For a detailed discussion of the public forum doctrine, see Daily v. New York City 
Housing Authority, 221 F. Supp. 2d 390, 396-401 (E.D. N.Y. 2002). 
 75. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM:
HISTORY, CASES, AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION AND 
GOVERNMENT 375 (2001) (citing Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Poulos v. New 
Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953)); see also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Murdock 
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
 76. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
 77. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. 
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).  
 78. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); see also
McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984) (park in which crèche was placed was 
considered a public forum, so message was private, nongovernmental speech), aff’d by 
equally divided court, Bd. of Trs. v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985). 
 79. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). There are such public 
forums, however, when there is enough space and sufficient political will: a park in 
California holds symbols of numerous associations representing many different faiths, new 
and old. Leslie C. Griffin, Fighting the New Wars of Religion: The Need for a Tolerant First 
Amendment, 62 ME. L. REV. 23, 71 (2010) (“Consider as a model the City of Mission Viejo, 
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 Free-standing, temporary religious symbols in a public forum were 
found constitutional in Capitol Square v. Pinette.
80
 In that case, the 
Ku Klux Klan requested permission to place a cross on the plaza in 
front of the Ohio State Capitol building (a traditional public forum) 
for a period of about two weeks.
81
 In a 7-2 decision, the Court upheld 
the inclusion of the Klan’s cross in the forum as private expression, 
finding no unconstitutional endorsement.
82
 A plurality would not 
have applied the Establishment Clause at all; for them, this was 
simply private speech in a public forum protected under the Free 
Speech Clause.
83
 The controlling concurrences, however, employed 
the endorsement test to ask whether the state’s “actions (operating 
the forum in a particular manner and permitting the religious 
expression to take place therein), and their relationship to the 
private speech at issue, actually convey a message of endorsement.”
84
The Court noted in dictum that endorsements included situations in 
which a “religious group may so dominate a public forum that a 
formal policy of equal access is transformed into a demonstration of 
approval.”
85
 Even the plurality conceded that a public forum could be 
manipulated in a way that allowed access only to certain religious 
groups, which would violate not only the Establishment Clause but 
California, which added a Muslim holiday display to an intersection that already contained 
Jewish and Christian decorations. The following year officials at first cancelled the display 
because so many religious groups wanted to participate, but later found a park large 
enough to accommodate displays from the ten to fifteen groups that applied to mount their 
own distinctive religious symbols.”).  
 80. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
 81.  Id. at 758.
82. Id. at 769-70.
 83. “The State did not sponsor respondents’ expression, the expression was made on 
government property that had been opened to the public for speech, and permission was 
requested through the same application process and on the same terms required of other 
private groups.” Id. at 763. “Religious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause 
where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, 
publicly announced and open to all on equal terms.” Id. at 770.  
 84. Id. at 777 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor elaborated: 
Where the government’s operation of a public forum has the effect of endorsing 
religion . . . the Establishment Clause is violated. This is so not because of 
“ ‘transferred endorsement’ ”or mistaken attribution of private speech to the 
State, but because the State’s own actions (operating the forum in a particular 
manner and permitting the religious expression to take place therein), and 
their relationship to the private speech at issue, actually convey a message of 
endorsement. At some point, for example, a private religious group may so 
dominate a public forum that a formal policy of equal access is transformed into 
a demonstration of approval . . . . Other circumstances may produce the same 
effect—whether because of the fortuity of geography, the nature of the particular 
public space, or the character of the religious speech at issue, among others.  
Id. at 777-78 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).  
 85. Id. at 777. Justice Souter’s concurrence discussed “the possibility of affixing a sign 
to the cross adequately disclaiming any government sponsorship or endorsement of it.” Id. 
at 784 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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the Free Speech Clause as well.
86
 It is clear, though, that both the 
plurality and concurrences agreed that government could not manage 
the forum in a way that would allow a group to monopolize or enjoy 
privileged access to the space.
87
 Thus, on private property and within independent public spaces, 
religious groups (as well as other entities and individuals) are able to 
express their beliefs in ways that are largely independent of 
government involvement.
88
 When private expression retains its 
integrity, various tensions are maintained, namely tensions between 
the state and the association, tensions among various associations in 
civil society, and tensions between the association and 
nonmembers.
89
 This allows religious associations their mediating 
functions. Most importantly, among the multiplicity of differing 
messages, church and state do not share a theological proclamation. 
There is no confusion regarding the identity of the speaker; the voice 
is that of the religious association. 
 Contrast this church-state relationship with the one that emerges 
when theologically significant symbols are offered and placed on 
government property. A new element not present in the private 
property/public forum contexts enters the picture: state acceptance of 
the symbol, which signals government adoption of the expression.
90
 If 
a court finds, based upon factors to be described later, that the 
 86. Id. at 766 (“Of course, giving sectarian religious speech preferential access to a 
forum close to the seat of government (or anywhere else for that matter) would violate the 
Establishment Clause (as well as the Free Speech Clause, since it would involve content 
discrimination). And one can conceive of a case in which a governmental entity 
manipulates its administration of a public forum close to the seat of government (or within 
a government building) in such a manner that only certain religious groups take advantage 
of it, creating an impression of endorsement that is in fact accurate.”).
 87. This outcome is consistent with Professor Vischer’s argument that to “facilitate 
the mediating value of expression, courts must ensure . . . associations’ access to any public 
forum established by the government.” VISCHER, CONSCIENCE, supra note 48, at 135.  
 88. Of course private property is regulated by zoning ordinances, and public forums 
are regulated in time, place, and manner. Zoning and other kinds of land use controls can 
indeed involve government in religious decisions, especially when religious design (and 
therefore religious expression) is affected. Such involvement, in my view, is illegitimate. 
See generally Carmella, Houses of Worship, supra note 7. But for the most part, zoning is a 
legitimate mechanism to protect surrounding neighbors from secondary harms; when 
applied in accordance with RLUIPA standards, zoning reflects an appropriate church-state 
relationship. Within a public forum, government cannot discriminate based upon content 
or viewpoint; but time, place, and manner restrictions, which are constitutionally 
permitted, do not involve the state in religious decisions.   
 89. Indeed, the tensions may be heightened in the forum, where different symbols 
representing opposing claims can be juxtaposed. Some mediating groups may decide not to 
participate in a forum because of the challenge from other groups’ messages; see infra
notes 194-196 and accompanying text. But a public forum can provide an opportunity to 
engage in forms of symbolic discourse not possible on private property, as when a group of 
local churches placed multiple crosses on the statehouse plaza in direct response to the 
Klan’s abomination of the symbol. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. at 
783, 792 (Souter, J., concurring).  
 90. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009).  
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symbol indeed conveys an intact religious message, then the court 
will determine this to be unconstitutional governmental sponsorship, 
affiliation, support, or promotion—that is, “endorsement” of the 
religious meaning the group ascribes to the symbol. But the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence, which guides lower courts on these cases, 
completely ignores what I consider to be the most significant 
rationale for this determination: the negative effects of state 
involvement on the donors (as well as on those who share their 
intended meaning). Their expression is diluted and their important 
societal functions are compromised.  
 The negative impacts involve the reduction in critical tensions 
that sustain associational diversity and mediating function. When 
one religious message is promoted in closed government spaces, the 
state takes on the religious voice.
91
 Contrary to what some might 
think, this governmental appropriation of religion does not contribute 
to the vibrancy of associational life or expression and certainly does 
not empower the religious group that embraces the symbol. Once the 
state adopts a particular theologically significant symbol, tensions 
necessary to the mediating function of groups in civil society are 
relaxed. One religious group now has state power behind its symbolic 
expression, which corrodes the necessary distinction between state 
and church, threatening a collapse of identity and voice and 
destroying the independence of the association. Once one religious 
message is privileged, the tensions are broken that would otherwise 
sustain open access for multiple voices to independent public spaces. 
Further, the interaction among religious associations in society 
 91. Professor Vischer has made these observations in the context of speech 
(specifically, prayer) and has concluded that “religious messages should not be given access 
to a forum that is closed to competing messages.” VISCHER, CONSCIENCE, supra note 48, at 
137. He writes,  
[M]eaningful application of the Establishment clause . . . demands that 
government-controlled spaces not be captured by any single religious message 
or messenger. To do so eviscerates the mediating function of religious 
associations by giving a single messenger (whether an individual or group) a 
state trump over competing messengers, negating the tension that is key to 
their mediating role . . . . [When government] grant[s] access to a single 
religious message, [it] effectively becom[es] the vehicle for the expression of a 
particular religious message into a forum . . . not open to other religious (or 
nonreligious) messages. Allowing the government to co-opt a message that 
could otherwise be expressed in other ways by religious groups does not 
enhance the vitality or viability of associations. If anything, it diminishes 
associations. This diminishment takes two forms. First, the government-
sanctioned expression renders moot the mediating function of some 
associations to the extent their message is already communicated in the 
government-controlled forum. Second, it negates the mediating function of 
other associations to the extent their message is trumped by the government’s 
adoption of a competing message. 
Id.
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becomes distorted, because the state has appropriated the voice of 
one and not others, thereby threatening the mediating role for all 
groups—those that share the message and those that do not. By 
asserting theological competence, the state has exceeded its proper 
roles in maintaining public order, coordinating nonstate groups 
toward the common good, and assisting them in these efforts.   
 The appropriation of religious messages also threatens another 
important function of religious groups: limiting the state and 
maintaining the boundary between civil society and the state.
92
Dissenting religious groups that demanded disestablishment during 
the founding period, concerned that state sponsorship weakens and 
corrupts religion, were especially afraid to lose this function of 
churches.
93
 Religious groups limit the state not only by their existence 
but also by prophetic critique of the state and its authoritarian 
tendencies.
94
 Government co-optation of the messages of some 
religious groups practically ensures that they will be less vibrant 
messengers in society, making it much harder for them to be critical 
of government. Thus, when the state promotes a religious message,  
[b]lurring the line between associational and governmental 
interests not only makes it more difficult for the government to 
pursue its own proper interests within the moral marketplace, but, 
ultimately, it eviscerates the association’s capacity to function as a 
vehicle for conscience by turning it into an arm of the state.
95
 Though the Court does not view the issues from the perspective of 
associational health in civil society, it has obviously recognized that 
something is wrong when the state takes on the religious expression 
of a nonstate actor. But the Court’s corrective is even worse. The 
 92. See, e.g., Carmella, Exemptions, supra note 18, at 409-12. 
 93. They made these arguments:  
(1) that to be genuine in one’s faith, religious belief and practice must be 
voluntary; (2) that establishment subordinates the church to the state, thus 
yielding jurisdiction over religious doctrine and governance for which the civil 
state is wholly without competence; (3) that establishment has a corrupting 
effect on the church and its clerics; (4) that as an institution that mediates 
between the state and the people, the churches presume to sit in judgment 
over, and thereby help limit, the state and its authoritarian pretensions; (5) 
that only a free and independent church will successfully exercise its prophetic 
voice and critique the state, a role important to limiting the state; (6) that a 
civil government that treats religions unequally will cause jealously [sic] and 
resentments within the body politic; (7) that religion, if vibrant and respected, 
can help temper selfish passions and oppressive tendencies and thus protect 
against harmful swings in popular sentiment to which republics are vulnerable; 
and (8) that religion, when perverted into a civil religion, collapses two very 
different and very powerful allegiances, risking a dangerous confounding of 
God and country, faith and nationalism.  
Esbeck, supra note 19, at 1581. 
 94. See id.
 95. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE, supra note 48, at 138. 
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Establishment Clause, as currently interpreted, demands that the 
religious message be changed—that is, secularized or minimized, 
typically by placement of the symbol. By desacralizing the symbol, 
the state has sufficiently broken the link between the donor’s 
expression and what is now government expression, reflecting its 
own purposes and values. Indeed, the state must contextualize the 
symbol to ensure that it will be perceived in nonreligious terms by 
some judicially constructed observer. Thus, government is 
constitutionally required to redefine theologically significant symbols 
as having a predominant nonreligious meaning, at least in that 
particular place. The law requires government to create a secular 
tableau that speaks of pluralism or civic morality, while depriving 
the religious speaker within the tableau of the ability to speak 
independently. The resulting relationship between religious groups 
and the state subordinates, indeed negates, the tensions that sustain 
the shared bonds of identity, voice, and purpose necessary for any 
group’s mediating function. In my view, it is far worse for 
government to change a religious message than to affiliate with it. 
Rather than privileging a religious message, the state deconstructs 
and reconstructs it as government speech. Government has no power 
to do this, and yet the Court reads the Constitution to require it.
96
 Based on the multiple interpretations generated under the 
endorsement inquiry, symbols loaned for temporary display are re-
defined, depending upon placement, context, and other factors.
97
 With 
respect to symbols donated for permanent display, a slightly more 
complex analysis is employed. First, government engages in 
“selective receptivity;” that is, it has discretion to accept or reject the 
donor’s message.
98
 Acceptance means that the state is willing to be 
associated with the donor group’s message; yet immediately upon 
acceptance, the donor’s message is terminated, and the expression 
becomes governmental.
99
 But even determining the donor’s message 
 96. See infra Part III.B. 
 97. See infra notes 120-129 and accompanying text discussing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 
U.S. 668 (1984) and County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).  
 98. When government officials are deciding whether to accept a symbol that has been 
offered, they “select the monuments that portray what they view as appropriate for the 
place in question, taking into account such content-based factors as esthetics, history, and 
local culture.” Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009).  
 99. In Pleasant Grove City, the Supreme Court noted:  
Just as government-commissioned and government-financed monuments speak 
for the government, so do privately financed and donated monuments that the 
government accepts and displays to the public on government land. It certainly 
is not common for property owners to open up their property for the installation 
of permanent monuments that convey a message with which they do not wish 
to be associated. And because property owners typically do not permit the 
construction of such monuments on their land, persons who observe donated 
monuments routinely—and reasonably—interpret them as conveying some 
message on the property owner’s behalf . . . .  
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is difficult;
100
 and even if the message could be determined at the 
time of acceptance, the donor’s meaning and the state’s meaning can 
diverge over time, as well as due to placement and context.
101
 It 
might also change over time with the addition of other objects in the 
vicinity and with the addition of interpretive commentary.
102
 Once 
the symbol becomes government speech, there is no guarantee that 
the donor’s message will continue; indeed, given the Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence, a donor’s religious message should not 
continue. Permanent displays, then, like temporary ones, must 
involve secularization or minimization of religious meaning. 
 My concern is not that the religious group has lost control of its 
intended message. Whenever one employs symbols for expression, 
there is no guarantee that the meaning viewers receive will be the 
same as what the speaker intended. Rather my concern is the 
resulting church-state relationship and the broader societal 
implications. The Court fails to acknowledge the negative impacts on 
religious associations: government promotion of religious messages 
impairs the tensions necessary to sustain the groups’ mediating and 
limiting roles. Further, government transformation of religious 
messages requires an even more distorted relationship between 
associations and the state, one in which the state substitutes its own 
meaning of religious symbols that would not have been placed on 
public property but for the action of a nonstate association.  
 Is there a way to keep intended messages intact on public 
property without involving government in the sponsorship or 
 . . . . 
 . . . The monuments that are accepted . . . are meant to convey and have the 
effect of conveying a government message, and they thus constitute 
government speech.  
Id. at 1133-34.  
 100. The Court specifically rejected the notion that  
a monument can convey only one “message” . . . [i.e.,] the message intended by 
the donor . . . . 
. . . .
. . . [T]ext-based monuments are almost certain to evoke different thoughts and 
sentiments in the minds of different observers, and the effect of monuments 
that do not contain text is likely to be even more variable. . . .  
. . . [I]t frequently is not possible to identify a single “message” that is conveyed 
by an object or structure, and consequently, the thoughts or sentiments 
expressed by a government entity that accepts and displays such an object may 
be quite different from those of either its creator or its donor.  
Id. at 1135-36. This is especially the case when symbols are financed by many separate donors. 
 101. When the state accepts a privately donated monument and places it on public 
property, it engages in expressive conduct, but “does not necessarily endorse the specific 
meaning that any particular donor sees in the monument.” Id. at 1136. The message 
conveyed might be “altered by the subsequent addition of other monuments” and “may 
change over time.” Id.
 102. Id. at 1136-37; see infra notes 159-162 and accompanying text. 
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transformation of those messages—as is possible on private property 
and in public forums?
103
 Such expressive integrity and independence 
is critical to sustaining the multiplicity of societal and state tensions 
that create associational diversity. Or is the state’s control over the 
management of its own property so extensive that its involvement in 
expression is inevitable?
104
 Perhaps outside the context of a donation 
of symbols we might be able to conceive of a more capacious 
understanding of independent public spaces, for instance, recognizing 
some public property to serve as de facto public forums. I would 
venture to guess that private groups often think they continue to 
speak through their symbols, even when those objects are not placed 
in a traditional or designated forum. Indeed, there may be many 
instances in which groups displaying symbols have no intention of 
asking for government approval of their message or of ceding their 
message to the state.
105
 We explore these questions more thoroughly 
in Part IV. But first we turn to an analysis of the Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence to document more closely how we have gotten 
to where we are.  
III.  THE RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS JURISPRUDENCE
 As we see from the normative argument presented, a critical 
element of religious freedom in civil society is ensuring the integrity 
and independence of all associations—especially religious groups—
that mediate between the individual and the state. These groups 
provide their members with a common identity, purpose, and voice, 
and help build the social connections necessary for meaningful 
existence. This role places them in deep tension with the state, as 
well as with other associations and nonmembers, and even to some 
degree with their own members.
106
 Whether or not their goals are 
controversial or compatible with those of the state, religious 
associations enjoy varying degrees of independence, and by their 
existence and critique, help to limit governmental power. In 
 103. Recall the discussion in the Introduction concerning the fact that while the 
meaning cannot be controlled, the religious group will nonetheless attempt to proclaim its 
beliefs symbolically. Retaining the connection between the speaker and the proclamation is 
what is meant by “keeping an intended message intact.” 
 104. Whether public property “by law or tradition [has] been given the status of a 
public forum, or rather has been reserved for specific official uses” is significant. Capitol 
Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995). For a critique of the 
state’s excessive control over its property, especially regarding public forums, see generally 
Timothy Zick, Property, Place, and Public Discourse, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 173, 175 
(2006) [hereinafter Zick, Property, Place, and Discourse]; Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial 
Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581, 583-84 (2006) [hereinafter Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics]; 
Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 439, 444-48 (2006) [hereinafter Zick, Space, Place, and Speech].
 105. See infra notes 167-170 and accompanying text.  
 106. See Robert K. Vischer, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Rethinking the Value of 
Associations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 949, 1020-21 (2004). 
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respecting the boundary between civil society and the state, and 
recognizing both the limits of its own authority and the mediating 
role of religious groups, the state plays no role in the creation of 
religious identity among the citizens or the promotion of a religious 
message; instead, its public ordering and coordinating roles provide a 
legal structure in which religious groups create their own identities 
and promote their own messages.
107
 That freedom for creating and sustaining religious associations 
involves, in part, protecting locations for religious exercise. Shared 
religious bonds have to be cultivated in a particular place, and in the 
United States, that usually occurs on private property; public spaces 
dedicated to free speech serve as additional (though sometimes 
exclusive) outlets for religious exercise. The bodies of statutory and 
constitutional law associated with these kinds of properties 
acknowledge that the relationship between religious groups and their 
individual members on the one hand, and government on the other, 
can indeed be harmful to groups. On private property, government 
regulation prohibiting construction of a house of worship without 
sufficient justification is clearly understood to harm the communal 
aspects of religious exercise. In public forums, government 
discrimination against religious groups is clearly understood to affect 
rights of associations.  
 But the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of religious symbols on 
public property does not acknowledge the possibility of harm to the 
mediating and limiting functions of religious groups that loan or 
donate symbols for display and to those other groups that share those 
symbols. The Court also fails to recognize the specific harmful effects 
on their private expression when government sponsors their 
messages and when government transforms their messages for its 
own purposes, with its own meaning. Finally, the Court offers no 
attempt to coordinate the bodies of law associated with religion on 
private property, in public forums, and on public property. Yet 
without this coordination, how can we ensure fidelity to the 
overarching constitutional design that protects vibrant religious life 
in civil society?  
A.  Ignoring Religious Associations and their Messages 
 The Establishment Clause is often said to embody values of 
neutrality, separation, and equality; they are actually instrumental 
values in service to the ultimate goal of religious freedom. 
 107. The complexities of the processes by which religious groups actually negotiate 
their identities with members, nonmembers and social institutions are obviously beyond 
the scope of this Article. For a description see generally Symposium, Law, Religion, and 
Identity, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1 (2001); Winnifred Fallers Sullivan & Frank E. Reynolds,
Symposium Introduction: Law, Religion, and Identity, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1 (2001). 
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Emphasizing these values in isolation obscures the powerful 
freedom-enhancing impacts of disestablishment.
108
 As Justice 
O’Connor has acknowledged, both the Establishment Clause and the 
Free Exercise Clause are about freedom: 
Reasonable minds can disagree about how to apply the Religion 
Clauses in a given case. But the goal of the Clauses is clear: to 
carry out the Founders’ plan of preserving religious liberty to the 
fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society. By enforcing the 
Clauses, we have kept religion a matter for the individual 
conscience, not for the prosecutor or bureaucrat. At a time when 
we see around the world the violent consequences of the 
assumption of religious authority by government, Americans may 
count themselves fortunate: Our regard for constitutional 
boundaries has protected us from similar travails, while allowing 
private religious exercise to flourish. The well-known statement 
that “[w]e are a religious people” has proved true. Americans 
attend their places of worship more often than do citizens of other 
developed nations, and describe religion as playing an especially 
important role in their lives.
109
 The Establishment Clause has been interpreted to place 
numerous structural restraints on government, all of which protect 
religious freedom for associations as well as individuals.
110
 Most 
fundamentally, the state cannot assume or absorb religious functions 
because it is not competent in theological or ecclesiastical matters. 
Indeed, this is the most obvious meaning of “separation of church and 
state.”
111
 The state cannot privilege some religious groups with 
favored status; nor is it competent to sponsor devotional exercises
112
or religious instruction,
113
 to proclaim religious truth
114
 or compel 
professions of faith.
115
 Mediating associations in society—like families 
 108. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 699 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(“[U]ntutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can lead to . . . hostility to the religious 
. . . .” (quoting Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963)).  
 109. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 110. Under the Establishment Clause, “government may not promote or affiliate itself 
with any religious doctrine or organization, . . . may not delegate a governmental power to 
a religious institution, and may not involve itself too deeply in such an institution’s 
affairs.” Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 591 (1989). 
 111. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 
Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982); OLIVER O’DONOVAN, THE DESIRE OF NATIONS: REDISCOVERING 
THE ROOTS OF POLITICAL THEOLOGY 244 (1996) (separation of church and state as “an 
uncommunicative formula, to be sure, since those words assert nothing that could have 
perturbed the most traditional apologist for dual jurisdiction in Christendom”).  
 112. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 307 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 
U.S. 577, 586-88 (1992); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).  
 113. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1987); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 
42 (1980); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948). 
 114. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944). 
 115. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 491-92 (1961). 
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and religious groups—are charged with these tasks.
116
 At the same 
time, “[a] secular state, it must be remembered, is not the same as an 
atheistic or antireligious state. . . . [T]here is no orthodoxy on 
religious matters in the secular state.”
117
 It makes sense, then, that 
in addition to the structural restraints, the state also has an 
affirmative duty to protect religious freedom and to recognize the 
presence of religion in society. These affirmative protections also 
benefit groups as well as individuals. 
 Specific restraints with respect to religious use and symbolism on 
public property can be understood as protections for mediating 
groups in some contexts. For instance, if government cannot preach 
or teach religion, then the state cannot have its own architectural or 
symbolic expressions of religion like its own house of worship on 
government land or a theological symbol affixed to the dome of the 
statehouse.
118
 Instead, the state must ensure freedom for the 
symbolic expression of groups and individuals on private property 
and in independent public spaces. If the state cannot privilege some 
religious groups over others, then it cannot sponsor or promote a 
group’s expression on government property. Instead, the state is 
obligated to secure the freedom of private expression for those groups 
on private property and in independent public spaces. These themes 
are not so clear, however, in the religious symbols jurisprudence. 
 The Supreme Court’s symbols cases are divided into seasonal and 
permanent displays. The first two decisions, from the 1980s, involved 
challenges brought by the American Civil Liberties Union to 
Christmas crèches and a Chanukah menorah. In Lynch v. Donnelly,
the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, together with the local 
merchants association, sponsored a large Christmas season display 
in a privately owned park in the center of the shopping district.
119
 All 
of the many figures in the display—which included Santa’s house, 
reindeer and sleigh, candles, stars, poles, live as well as painted cut 
out evergreens, a talking wishing well, musician figures, and nativity 
scene—were owned by the City.
120
 The Pawtucket crèche was held not 
 116. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 226 (“The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, 
achieved through a long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable 
citadel of the individual heart and mind.”).  
 117. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 610-11 (1989). 
 118. And conversely, allowances for religious use and symbolism on public property are 
typically tied to the promotion of religious freedom, as with government cemeteries in 
which religious grave markers can be chosen by families, and chapels found in prisons, 
military installations, and government owned airports. Even spaces like the U.S. Senate Chapel 
are justified as accommodating the free exercise of religion for government employees.  
 119. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984). 
 120. Id. (“Each year, in cooperation with the downtown retail merchants’ association, 
the City of Pawtucket, R.I., erects a Christmas display as part of its observance of the 
Christmas holiday season. The display is situated in a park owned by a nonprofit organization 
and located in the heart of the shopping district.”). For an excellent discussion of the 
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to violate the Establishment Clause. Five years later, Allegheny v. 
ACLU involved both a crèche (owned by the Holy Name Society, a 
Catholic organization)
121
 and a menorah (owned by Chabad, a Jewish 
organization),
122
 both of which were donated for display in 
Pittsburgh. The Pittsburgh crèche was placed inside the Allegheny 
County Courthouse alone at the top of the Grand Staircase,
123
 and 
the eighteen-foot tall menorah was placed on the steps outside the 
City-County Building alongside a 45-foot tall Christmas tree and sign 
that read “Salute to Liberty.”
124
 The menorah was held not to violate 
the Establishment Clause, but the Pittsburgh crèche was found to 
constitute government endorsement of a religious message.
125
 Justice O’Connor introduced her endorsement test in her 
concurrence in Lynch. Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority 
opinion, which deemed the crèche to be a passive symbol that noted 
the origins of Christmas.
126
 In Justice O’Connor’s language, the 
reasonable observer would view the crèche as part of “the celebration 
of the public holiday through its traditional symbols.”
127
 She and 
Justice Blackmun later distinguished the Lynch crèche from the 
courthouse crèche in their controlling concurrences in Allegheny.
128
There, they thought a reasonable observer would understand the 
Pittsburgh courthouse display to be sending a “message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the 
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents 
that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
decision, see WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, PAYING THE WORDS EXTRA: RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 53 (1994) (noting that the multiplicity of 
objects in the display “[t]o a student of religion . . . is a motherlode of sacred objects”).  
 121. Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 579. (“Since 1981, the county has permitted the 
Holy Name Society, a Roman Catholic group, to display a crèche in the county courthouse 
during the Christmas holiday season.”).  
 122. Id. at 587 (“The menorah is owned by Chabad, a Jewish group, but is stored, 
erected, and removed each year by the city.”). 
 123. Id. at 579-80. 
 124. Id. at 581-82. 
 125. Id. at 621. 
 126. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). Chief Justice Burger does not deny 
the religiousness of the holiday, admitting that all the Christmas symbols “recall the 
religious nature of the Holiday.” Id. Because it is no secret that the decorations celebrate 
Christmas, and the crèche symbolizes the origins of that holiday, no constitutional 
violation has occurred. “In our modern, complex society, whose traditions and 
constitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage diversity and pluralism in all areas, an 
absolutist approach [to Establishment Clause interpretation] is simplistic and has been 
uniformly rejected by the Court.” Id. at 678.
 127. Id. at 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring). “Although the religious and indeed sectarian 
significance of the crèche . . . is not neutralized by the setting, the overall holiday setting 
changes what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display . . . . The 
display celebrates a public holiday . . . .” Id. at 692. 
 128. Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598 (“This praise to God in Christian terms is 
indisputably religious—indeed sectarian—just as it is when said in the Gospel or in a 
church service.”).  
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community.”
129
 As to the menorah, O’Connor and Blackmun could not 
agree on its meaning. O’Connor said unequivocally that it was a 
religious symbol, but Blackmun’s opinion suggested it had been 
secularized. They did agree, though, that the placement of the 
menorah next to a Christmas tree and patriotic sign meant that it 
would be understood by the reasonable observer to be a celebration 
of pluralism.
130
 Nearly two decades later, the Supreme Court issued two more 
decisions, both involving Ten Commandments displays. In McCreary 
County v. ACLU, the ACLU challenged three consecutive displays 
inside the county courthouse: the first contained only the Ten 
Commandments; a second display placed other documents that 
contained religious references alongside the Ten Commandments; a 
third replaced the second, and included a mix of documents 
“significant in the historical foundation of American government” 
along with the Ten Commandments.
131
 In Van Orden v. Perry, a 
citizen challenged a six-foot tall granite monument located in the 
park in front of the Texas capitol building that had been donated by 
the Eagles, a civic organization, forty years earlier.
132
 Seventeen 
monuments and twenty-one historical markers were also 
permanently displayed in the park.
133
 In decisions issued the same 
day, the Court found the displays in McCreary unconstitutional,
134
but held the monument in Van Orden permissible.
135
 Justice Souter’s opinion for the majority in McCreary employed 
the endorsement analysis, but focused on the lack of a secular 
purpose for any of the displays.
136
 Justice Breyer’s controlling 
concurrence in Van Orden used not the endorsement inquiry but 
rather a test of “legal judgment.” For him, this particular Ten 
Commandments monument in its nonsacral setting was primarily 
civic in nature. Troubled by the social disruption and religious 
conflict that would result from ordering its removal (and by 
 129. Id. at 595 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688). 
 130. Id. at 621.
 131. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 871 (2005).  
 132. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682 (2005). The Eagles had donated many such 
monuments to governments throughout the nation as part of its campaign against juvenile 
delinquency in the mid-to-late twentieth century. The state accepted donation of the 
monument from the Eagles, “a national social, civic and patriotic organization.” Id. The 
state then selected the site, while the Eagles paid costs of erecting the monument.  
 133. Id. at 681.
134. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 881. 
 135. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691-92. 
 136. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 860 (The display “sends the . . . message to . . . 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members . . . .” 
(quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
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implication hundreds like it throughout the nation), he did not find a 
sufficient threat to religious freedom to justify those consequences.
137
 Absent from these decisions is any concern for negative impacts on 
the donors (and other mediating groups that share their messages) 
and on the messages themselves.
138
 The Holy Name Society 
proclaimed its beliefs through the crèche in Allegheny; Chabad 
signaled its faith through the menorah in Allegheny; the Order of 
Eagles spoke of its commitment to young people through its Ten 
Commandments monument at the Texas statehouse in Van Orden.
What were the effects on these groups and countless others like them 
that loaned or donated religious symbols for display on public 
property? Several of the justices described the groups, but only to the 
extent useful for interpreting the content of the message conveyed. 
Yet the cases only occasionally mention the impacts of government 
use of religious symbols on religious freedom generally, and never in 
connection with the health or vitality of the groups that bring their 
symbolic expression to public property. Even Justice O’Connor, who 
squarely acknowledges the connection between restraints on 
government use of religious symbols and religious freedom, does not 
acknowledge that the very groups whose religious messages are 
communicated on public property might suffer co-optation and 
dilution of their messages within and among associational life in civil 
society.
139
 A focus on these issues would have led to the question of 
 137. Justice Breyer was concerned with the repercussions of razing not just this 
monument but the hundreds of similar monuments donated by the Eagles that would 
result from a holding of unconstitutionality. Ordering the “removal of longstanding 
depictions of the Ten Commandments from public buildings across the Nation . . . could 
thereby create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment 
Clause seeks to avoid.” Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 704. The Establishment Clause “does not 
compel the government to purge from the public sphere all that in any way partakes of the 
religious. Such absolutism is not only inconsistent with our national traditions, but would 
also tend to promote the kind of social conflict the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.” 
Id. at 699 (internal citations omitted). 
 138. In McCreary, officials themselves constructed the displays containing the Ten 
Commandments. While this affects groups that share this theologically significant symbol, 
there was no donor group involved, as in Allegheny and Van Orden. In Lynch, the analysis 
is a bit more complex. Pawtucket had sponsored the Christmas display from the 1940s to 
the 1970s in a park on the city’s periphery. In 1973 the City moved it to the privately 
owned park in the center city “to give a boost to downtown merchants who had lost 
business to the shopping malls in a time of economic recession.” SULLIVAN, supra note 120,
at 51. The merchants’ association became a co-sponsor of the display. It may fairly be said 
that the merchants’ association, while not a donor, was involved in the display and its 
message, because of the very long history of church-commercial cooperation on “Keeping 
Christ in Christmas.” This relationship, which developed throughout the late nineteenth 
and early to mid-twentieth century is detailed in a fascinating book by LEIGH ERIC 
SCHMIDT, CONSUMER RITES: THE BUYING AND SELLING OF AMERICAN HOLIDAYS (1995). 
Though the mayor of Pawtucket made “Keeping Christ in Christmas” a rallying cry during 
the Lynch litigation, the business community had developed this movement in 
collaboration with religious groups long before government got involved.  
 139. Under the Religion Clauses, concern for the vibrancy of religious associations has 
typically been confined to these contexts: funding of religious education (particularly in the 
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whether the public crèche displays might have diluted the vibrancy 
and meaning of private crèche displays elsewhere, and whether 
similar dilution might have occurred in connection with the private 
displays of the menorah and Ten Commandments as well.  
 Instead of attending to the freedom and integrity of nonstate 
actors in civil society, the Court has produced three broad approaches 
to religious symbols adjudication that have their own emphases and 
purposes. Pluralities in both Allegheny
140
 and Van Orden
141
 proposed 
per se rules to govern this area which would result in little policing 
by federal courts of displays and monuments and greater deference to 
local governments. They would have upheld both the crèche and the 
menorah in Allegheny and the Ten Commandments displays in 
McCreary as well as Van Orden. Convinced that “[t]he ability of the 
organized community to recognize and accommodate religion in a 
society with a pervasive public sector requires diligent observance of 
the border between accommodation and establishment,”
142
 Justice 
Kennedy articulated the position in Allegheny: courts should prohibit 
only those symbols the government seeks to use for proselytization or 
coercion of religious faith. If “[p]assersby who disagree with the 
message conveyed by these displays are free to ignore them, or even 
to turn their backs,” then they are merely passive symbols that cause 
no harm.
143
 A display can still be coercive, even if no legal penalties 
are involved. Kennedy writes,  
I doubt not, for example, that the Clause forbids a city to permit 
the permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city 
hall. . . . [S]uch an obtrusive year-round religious display would 
place the government’s weight behind an obvious effort to 
proselytize on behalf of a particular religion.
144
 Justice Scalia has gone the furthest of any member of the Court to 
state an affirmative vision of allowable religious symbols on public 
property. In his McCreary dissent, he reiterates and extends a theme 
developed in other decisions: citizens should be able to experience 
religious symbols and exercises “as a people.”
145
 While some symbols 
1970s and 80s when it was thought that the mission of religious schools was highly 
vulnerable to corruption by state regulation that would accompany state funding), civil 
adjudication of religious claims (the “church autonomy” decisions), and impediments to the 
conscience claims of religious groups (although after Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990), this concern has lost its traction).  
 140. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and White.  
 141. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. 
 142. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989). 
 143. Id. at 664.
 144. Id. at 661. Justice Kennedy is particularly wedded to the notion that no one 
should be coerced (even psychologically) into religious practice. See also Lee v. Weisman, 
505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992). 
 145. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 900 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“On the 
one hand, the interest of that minority [adherents of nonwestern faiths and nonbelievers] 
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cannot serve this function because they are not widely shared,
146
 he 
considers the Ten Commandments to be broadly nondenominational, 
revered by and representing three great monotheistic faith traditions 
(Judaism, Christianity and Islam), which make up nearly 98% of the 
nation’s religious demographic.
147
 In sharp contrast to this openness regarding religion on public 
property, Justice Stevens (joined after a time by Justice Ginsburg) 
would prohibit all religious symbols—crèche, menorah, Ten 
Commandments, and other symbols. He is concerned that mixing 
government and religion corrupts religion, but he is no evangelical 
separationist. His primary focus is on the psychological impacts—
framed as “being offended”—that viewers experience, not only for 
those who do not share the symbol but especially for those who do.
148
Writing in Allegheny, he said,  
In my opinion the Establishment Clause should be construed to 
create a strong presumption against the display of religious 
symbols on public property. There is always a risk that such 
symbols will offend nonmembers of the faith being advertised as 
well as adherents who consider the particular advertisement 
disrespectful. Some devout Christians believe that the crèche 
should be placed only in reverential settings, such as a church or 
perhaps a private home; they do not countenance its use as an 
aid to commercialization of Christ’s birthday. In this very 
suit, members of the Jewish faith firmly opposed the use to which 
the menorah was put by the particular sect that sponsored the 
display . . . .
149
 The most influential author in the symbols opinions has been 
Justice O’Connor, whose endorsement test—though rejected by the 
pluralities and amended significantly by Justice Stevens
150
—has been 
an important influence among other colleagues and has become the 
predominant test used by lower courts. The test, announced in her 
in not feeling ‘excluded’; but on the other, the interest of the overwhelming majority of 
religious believers in being able to give God thanks and supplication as a people, and with 
respect to our national endeavors. Our national tradition has resolved that conflict in favor 
of the majority.”). 
 146. A common faith excludes “details upon which men and women who believe in a 
benevolent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world are known to differ (for example, 
the divinity of Christ).” Lee, 505 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 147. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 894. 
 148. See infra note 154 and accompanying text. Justice Brennan also expressed 
concern over offense “to those for whom the crèche has profound significance.” Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 712 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 149. Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 650-51 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part) (citations omitted).  
 150. Instead of a reasonable observer who possesses knowledge of the history and 
circumstances of a display, he would “ask whether some viewers of the religious display 
would be likely to perceive a government endorsement.” Capitol Square Review & Advisory 
Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 800 n.5 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Lynch concurrence, provides that “[i]f a reasonable observer would 
perceive a religious display in a government forum as government 
speech endorsing religion, then the display has made ‘religion 
relevant, in . . . public perception, to status in the political 
community.’ ”
151
 She has clarified it over the years, so that now we 
know that the reasonable observer is fully aware of the history and 
context of a symbol and is “a personification of a community ideal of 
reasonable behavior, determined by the [collective] social 
judgment.”
152
 In her view, the Lynch crèche and Allegheny menorah 
were properly viewed by the reasonable observer as celebrations of 
public holidays and pluralism; but the Allegheny crèche and both Ten 
Commandments displays signaled unconstitutional endorsements. 
Though the endorsement inquiry expresses an admirable expectation 
of equality among citizens, it has proved unworkable in application.
153
 None of these three positions properly accounts for religious 
associations in civil society. The pluralities show no concern for 
impacts on religious associations when the state appropriates their 
messages; if any liberty interest is expressed it is Justice Scalia’s 
concern for “the people” to have shared religio-civic symbols. In 
contrast, Justice Stevens recognizes a harm that results from seeing 
religious symbols (whether one’s own or another’s), but it is framed 
only in psychological and individualist terms of “offense.”
154
 The 
notion of “being offended,” however, simply does not capture the 
concern with diluting religious messages and threatening the 
mediating functions of religious associations.  
 Even Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test fails to account 
adequately for religious associational life. While she tries to employ 
the test as a mechanism for “protect[ing] the religious liberty [and] 
respect[ing] the religious diversity of the members of our pluralistic 
political community,”
155
 her version of endorsement is concerned only 
 151. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. at 787 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 152. Id. at 779-80 (quoting W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS
175 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 153. “[T]he Supreme Court’s own decisions on the issue have created so much 
uncertainty that the only sure answer is the one that eventually results from costly 
litigation.” Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Manitowoc Cnty., 708 F. Supp. 2d 773, 
781 (E.D. Wis. 2010). 
 154. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Atmospheric Harms in Constitutional Law, 69 MD. L.
REV. 149 (2009).  
 155. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 628 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
[T]he endorsement standard recognizes that the religious liberty so precious to 
the citizens who make up our diverse country is protected, not impeded, when 
government avoids endorsing religion . . . . Clearly, the government can 
acknowledge the role of religion in our society in numerous ways that do not 
amount to an endorsement.  
Id. at 631. 
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with persons made to feel like “outsiders” or “second class citizens.” 
Of course this is important. But to focus only on those excluded 
discounts any harm to those who share the symbols on display. 
Indeed, the test assumes that these persons are made to feel like 
“insiders,” delighted that they have captured government to use as a 
vehicle for spreading their message.
156
 While Justice O’Connor begins 
to identify a distortion of social relationships between and among 
groups in civil society,
157
 the analysis pays no regard to the effects of 
government use of religious symbols on the mediating functions of 
both outsider and insider groups.  
 Justice Breyer, who, like Justice O’Connor, explicitly connects the 
Establishment Clause to religious freedom, also ignored any possible 
negative impacts on the Eagles or other mediating groups in his 
controlling concurrence in Van Orden. For him, religious freedom 
would be endangered if the state favored religion or involved itself in 
religious exercises; the Ten Commandments monument, viewed as a 
civic object, posed no such danger because it expressed ethical 
teachings widely shared among the citizenry.
158
B.  Requiring Government Transformation of Religious Messages 
 When the Court determines that the state’s display of a religious 
symbol has violated the Establishment Clause, it assumes the 
 156. See id. at 601 n.51 (“Christians remain free to display crèches in their homes and 
churches. To be sure, prohibiting the display of a crèche in the courthouse deprives 
Christians of the satisfaction of seeing the government adopt their religious message as 
their own, but this kind of government affiliation with particular religious messages is 
precisely what the Establishment Clause precludes.”). 
 157. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 883 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(“Voluntary religious belief and expression may be as threatened when government takes 
the mantle of religion upon itself as when government directly interferes with private 
religious practices. When the government associates one set of religious beliefs with the 
state and identifies nonadherents as outsiders, it encroaches upon the individual’s decision 
about whether and how to worship. In the marketplace of ideas, the government has vast 
resources and special status. Government religious expression therefore risks crowding out 
private observance and distorting the natural interplay between competing beliefs. 
Allowing government to be a potential mouthpiece for competing religious ideas risks the 
sort of division that might easily spill over into suppression of rival beliefs. Tying secular 
and religious authority together poses risks to both.”). 
 158. Justice Breyer’s controlling concurrence in Van Orden recognizes the connection 
between the Establishment Clause restrictions on symbols and religious freedom, but is 
not concerned about groups like the Eagles, the donor of the Ten Commandments 
monument, and religious groups that share the symbol.  
  [T]he First Amendment does not prohibit practices which by any realistic 
measure create none of the dangers which it is designed to prevent and which 
do not so directly or substantially involve the state in religious exercises or in 
the favoring of religion as to have meaningful and practical impact.  
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Sch. Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 308 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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original religious message has remained intact, and that the religious 
association has used the state as a mere conduit or mouthpiece for 
the group’s message. In Allegheny, for instance, the plaque in front of 
the crèche at the top of the Grand Staircase read: “This Display 
Donated by the Holy Name Society.”
159
 Justice Blackmun noted that  
The fact that the crèche bears a sign disclosing its ownership by a 
Roman Catholic organization does not alter this conclusion [that it 
violates the endorsement test]. On the contrary, the sign simply 
demonstrates that the government is endorsing the religious 
message of that organization rather than communicating a 
message of its own. But the Establishment Clause does not limit 
only the religious content of the government’s own 
communications. It also prohibits the government’s support and 
promotion of religious communications by religious organizations. 
Indeed, the very concept of “endorsement” conveys the sense of 
promoting someone else’s message. . . . [Government is prohibited 
from] lending its support to the communication of a religious 
organization’s religious message.
160
Justice Souter’s dissent in Van Orden also follows this approach. He 
thought the Ten Commandments monument at the Texas statehouse 
violated the endorsement test because the Eagles, though a civic 
organization, was religious in its identity, purpose, and expression. 
He concluded that “[t]he State . . . expressly approved of the Eagles’ 
proselytizing, which it made on its own.”
161
 “There is no question,” 
Justice Souter wrote, “that the State in its own right is broadcasting 
the [Eagles’] religious message.”
162
 In contrast, when the Court determines that a display comports 
with the Establishment Clause, the key to constitutionality is 
whether the group’s religious message has been sufficiently 
desacralized by placement, context, explanatory plaques, and the 
like. Both the Lynch crèche and Allegheny menorah existed within a 
tableau of objects, religious and secular, arranged by government. 
And within that tableau, the Lynch crèche became a symbol of a 
season of goodwill, and the Allegheny menorah became a symbol of 
 159. Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 580. 
 160. Id. at 600-01 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Court concluded there was 
government “support and approval.” Id. at 599-600. 
 161. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 739 n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting). The speech of the Eagles, 
uttered forty years earlier, remained completely relevant today, as though one message 
had been issued and no changes had occurred in that time. For Justice Souter, the Eagles’ 
religious identity (members had to believe in a Supreme Being), purpose (using religious 
teachings to solve the social problem of juvenile delinquency), and message (follow these 
religious moral teachings) should have led to the monument’s unconstitutionality. “There is 
no question,” Justice Souter wrote, “that the State in its own right is broadcasting the 
religious message [by accepting the monument, and acknowledging the Eagles’ efforts to 
promote youth morality through placing Ten Commandments monuments around the 
country].” Id. 
 162. Id.
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pluralism. In this way, governmental appropriation of theologically 
significant symbols of Christianity and Judaism resulted in their 
redefinition as secular emblems. And though not analyzed under the 
endorsement test, the Ten Commandments at the Texas statehouse, 
placed among many secular historic and civic objects in a nonsacral 
setting, was found to convey not faith but a “broader moral and 
historical message reflective of a cultural heritage.”
163
 In all of these 
situations, the state’s acceptance and appropriation of the symbol 
changed the donor groups’ intended meaning.
164
 The crèche, 
menorah, and Ten Commandments are redefined by placement, 
context, and interpretive signs. As long as the theologically 
significant symbol is transformed into secularized government 
expression for governmental purposes, it is constitutional. 
 From the perspective of the religious association, both of these 
alternatives are harmful. Where the state promotes a group’s 
message, the necessary church-state tensions are reduced and the 
mediating function compromised. Where the state appropriates the 
message and gives it a new meaning—the constitutional scenario—a 
new harm is added to the familiar ones: now the state oversteps its 
bounds as a political sovereign to attempt to reconcile particularistic 
theological values with secular values. It is like the case of Engel v. 
Vitale, where the New York City Board of Regents wrote a prayer for 
students to recite each day.
165
 That prayer was broadly 
nondenominational and nonoffensive to many. In essence, it 
attempted to reconcile various religious proclamations with a 
unifying civic expression. But government simply cannot write a 
prayer, even in a way that diminishes the religious content. 
Similarly, it cannot adopt a theological symbol, even in a way that 
minimizes religious meaning. Ecumenical efforts, and the reconciling 
of public and particularistic norms, come not from government efforts 
but from religious associations working together. Such efforts are not 
part of the state’s public ordering role, nor of the state’s coordinating 
role. In this latter role, the government coordinates the activities of 
nonstate actors. Even when government itself is involved in a social 
task along with nonstate actors, it refrains from assuming or 
absorbing the independent functions of those actors. But as to 
theologically significant expression, government has no proper role of 
 163. Id. at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer acknowledged that it would be a 
religious symbol if found in a sacred setting. 
 164. The record in Van Orden, however, is unclear. If one takes Justice Souter’s view, 
then the Eagles’ intended message was blatantly religious. If one takes Justice Breyer’s 
view, the Eagles’ message was primarily civic. They are both correct to some degree, since 
civic republicans view religion (or certain religious values) to be beneficial to society. Each 
justice is emphasizing an aspect of the group’s civic republican faith. See ADAMS &
EMMERICH, supra note 66.
 165. 370 U.S. 421, 422 (1962). 
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its own.
166
 Its primary role is to make room for the voices of religious 
people and groups.  
 Religious groups should know this, and many of them do. Indeed, 
Chabad of Allegheny vigorously opposed a view that its menorah was 
somehow part of government expression, claiming the symbol was its
expression; it had even held religious candle lighting ceremonies at 
that site.
167
 Chabad understood the steps of the City-County Building 
in Pittsburgh to be a public forum, and claimed a right to place its 
menorah there as a matter of equal access under the Free Speech 
Clause.
168
 Had the Court found the location to serve the expressive 
purposes of an open forum, the message conveyed would have been 
Chabad’s; there would be no need for the state to transform the 
message from one commemorating a miracle into one celebrating 
American pluralism.
169
 The association’s voice would have been 
retained, as was possible in other contemporaneously litigated cases 
where menorahs were placed in public forums.
170
 166. Theologically significant expression does not include the use of religious textual or 
symbolic elements in civic or patriotic symbolic expression. See supra note 15. 
 167. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 621 n.70 (1989); see also id. at 642 
(Brennan, J., concurring).  
 168. Arguing in its brief (as an intervenor) to the Supreme Court that the menorah was 
the association’s speech, and not only permissible but required, Chabad wrote: “if 
Christianity may be represented by a Christmas tree on the steps of the . . . [b]uilding, 
Pittsburgh must grant equal access, on request, to the symbols of other faiths.” Brief for 
Petitioner Chabad, Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (No. 88-90), 1988 WL 
1025855, at *6. In the decision, the Court mentioned that Chabad had argued “that it has a 
constitutional right to display the menorah in front of the City-County building. In light of 
the Court’s disposition of the Establishment Clause question as to the menorah, there is no 
need to address Chabad’s contention.” Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 588 n.38. 
 169. The Grand Staircase does not appear to be the kind of location in which all were  
free to place their displays for weeks at a time, so that the presence of the 
crèche in that location for six weeks would then not serve to associate the 
government with the crèche. . . . [I]t remains true that any display located 
there fairly may be understood to express views that receive the support and 
endorsement of the government. . . . In this respect, the crèche here does not 
raise [a] “public forum” issue . . . .  
Id. at 600 n.50; cf. McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984). The Court noted the 
lack of a public forum in the crèche context even though it refused to reach Chabad’s public 
forum argument in connection with the menorah display. Five years before, Justice 
Brennan had specifically mentioned, in his Lynch dissent, that in contrast to a case 
involving equal access for religious speech to a public forum, “[h]ere . . . Pawtucket itself 
owns the crèche and instead of extending similar attention to a ‘broad spectrum’ of 
religious and secular groups, it has singled out Christianity for special treatment.” Lynch 
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 702 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 170. Similarly, Summum sought to place a monument of its “Seven Aphorisms” in a 
public park in which a Ten Commandments monument sat, on the assumption that the 
park was a public forum. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129-30 (2009). 
The Court held that it was not a public forum for purposes of permanent structures. 
Id. at 1138. 
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C.  Failing to Coordinate Public and Private Property Toward 
Religious Freedom 
 All of this jurisprudential development on symbols has taken 
place without any doctrinal coordination with approaches to religious 
exercise on private property and in public forums. A legal system like 
ours, wedded to some level of restriction concerning religion on public 
property, should recognize the need to protect religious exercise on 
private property. Indeed, it is well settled that religious exercise 
should be most vigorous on private property, where it “is promised 
freedom to pursue that mission.”171 But judicial interpretation tends 
to ignore the relationship between freedom on private property for 
religious uses and symbolism and the concomitant restrictions on 
public property. In the last few decades an explosion of land use 
regulation, both governmental and private, has created difficulties 
for religious individuals and groups to use or adorn private property 
in ways that give expression to their religious identity. Under the 
Free Exercise Clause, nondiscriminatory restrictions on uses and 
symbols are assumed to be fair when, in reality, they can severely 
impede religious exercise.172 Despite federal statutory attention to 
correct such impediments, we continue to see examples of deference 
to comprehensive regulation and support for religion-free spaces.173
Additionally, some restrictions on religious access to public forums 
recently have been found constitutional.174 So it is particularly ironic 
that some significant restrictions on religious use of private property 
and public forums continue, while theologically significant symbols 
are welcomed on public property.  
 This chaotic patchwork of decisions is not surprising. Courts do 
not coordinate public and private property jurisprudence to ensure 
fidelity to the overarching vision of a clearly defined state with no 
sacral function and a vast civil society that enjoys vibrant religious 
associational life. Among the Supreme Court justices highly 
deferential to general and neutral land use restrictions on private 
property, we find some with a broad understanding of participation 
 171. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992).  
 172. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 892-93 (1990) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 173. See, e.g., River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 
373-74 (7th Cir. 2010); Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 
F.3d 253, 264-68 (3d Cir. 2007); Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma, 
615 F. Supp. 2d 980, 996, 1000-01 (D. Ariz. 2009); see also Carmella, RLUIPA, supra note 
24, at 522-24.  
 174. See, e.g., Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 2011 WL2150974 (2d Cir. June 
2, 2011) (vacating injunction against Board of Education policy prohibiting use of public 
schools for worship purposes); Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 
F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2007) (prohibiting use of public library for worship purposes); see also
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Ca., Hastings Coll. for the Law v. Martinez, 
130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (university student groups required to comply with all-comers policy). 
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by religious groups in public forums. Taking this together with 
deference to nondenominational and noncoercive uses and symbols 
on public property, these justices seem to partially invert the 
paradigm, permitting religion on public property (both forum and 
nonforum property) while deferring to its restriction on private property.  
 Justice Stevens’ model of a presumption against religious symbols 
on public property fares no better; indeed, it subverts the overarching 
design. Initially the approach appears to be the one most committed 
to sustaining the vibrancy of religious exercise on private property;
175
in his Van Orden dissent, he argues that  
[t]he Eagles may donate as many monuments as they choose to be 
displayed in front of Protestant churches, benevolent organizations’ 
meeting places, or on the front lawns of private citizens. . . . [T]he 
message they seek to convey is surely more compatible with church 
property than with property that is located on the government side 
of the metaphorical wall.
176
But when we examine Justice Stevens’ record on free exercise 
interpretation, we see that he is always willing to defer to 
nondiscriminatory restrictions on religion.
177
 His decision in Kelo v. 
City of New London offers another look at a highly deferential 
position vis-à-vis local land use decisions that affect private 
property.
178
 In the public forum context, he would mandate the 
exclusion of religious objects, as he does not think free standing 
religious symbols (as opposed to transient speech) should be allowed 
at all.
179
 Moreover, he has extended this presumption against 
religious symbols to private property that was formerly owned by the 
government but transferred to cure a constitutional violation.
180
Justice Stevens’ deferential approach to land use restriction, taken 
together with the presumption against any religious symbol on any
public property, yields an approach that defers to or requires 
restrictions on religious land use everywhere—forum, nonforum, and 
private property.  
 Justice O’Connor comes closest to articulating interpretations of 
the Religion Clauses with a sense of the overarching vision of the 
state’s role in protecting vibrant religious life in civil society, but the 
endorsement test continues to muddle what might otherwise provide 
 175. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 176. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 735 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
 177. He goes well beyond his colleagues who share this view of the Free Exercise 
Clause. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536-37 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(RFRA’s special regard for religious practice violates the Establishment Clause). 
 178. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 179. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 797, 801-02 (1995) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 180. See infra notes 237-239 and accompanying text.  
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the building blocks to relational understanding of religion on private 
and public property. Her sense of both free exercise rights and 
private property rights is strong. She fought (unsuccessfully) against 
lowering the standard of review of general, neutral laws in the 
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, noting that burdens on 
religious exercise could result from nondiscriminatory laws just as 
easily as from discriminatory ones.
181
 Further, Justice O’Connor’s 
understanding of autonomy and expressive freedoms on private 
property is strong: her dissent in Kelo v. City of New London flatly 
rejected judicial deference to local land use controls when they 
severely affected the enjoyment of private property.
182
 She has a 
strong sense of government discretion in the management of its 
property,
183
 though all public property—forum and nonforum—is 
subject to the endorsement test, which she views as freedom-
enhancing. Even if her decisions can be pieced together to show 
consistency with the overarching design, Justice O’Connor does not 
explicitly coordinate public and private property understandings; and 
the endorsement test’s call for diminishing religiousness of a 
religious symbol remains problematic.  
 A comprehensive commitment to associational freedom necessarily 
requires coordination among the various bodies of law in order to 
address the issues of religion on private property, in public forums 
and on public property. Courts and legislatures must consider, in 
each of these areas, the effects of restriction on the identity, purpose, 
and expression of religious associations, particularly as those shared 
bonds are necessary to their mediating role in civil society. A holistic 
perspective that integrates these various fields of jurisprudence to 
protect religious associations would promote the overarching design 
that limits government and locates vibrant religious life in civil 
society. Such a balanced perspective would ensure a commitment to 
greater freedom for responsible religious land use on private property 
and greater religious access to (and broader definition of) public 
forums while at the same time enforcing some limits on 
governmental appropriation of theologically significant symbols 
loaned or donated by nonstate actors. Simply to restrict religious 
symbols on public property, without also ensuring greater freedom 
 181. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 892 (1990) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring); Flores, 521 U.S. at 544-45 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 182. 545 U.S. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 183. Though a regrettable lack of concern for the religious land use of Native 
Americans on its sacred lands (which is also federally owned property), the decision in 
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n draws a sharp distinction between 
religion on private and public property. 485 U.S. 439, 452-53 (1988) (special protections for 
Native American religious exercise on federal lands could result in an unconstitutional 
“religious servitude”; only access to sacred sites could be expected); see also supra note 43 
and accompanying text. 
2011]  SYMBOLIC RELIGIOUS SPEECH 523
for religious groups and individuals to engage in symbolic expression 
on private property and in independent public spaces, would create a 
religion-restrictive regime across the board. Moreover, to restrict all 
religious symbols without distinguishing between symbols of active 
religious communities and symbols long invested with civic 
significance would promote a kind of iconoclasm disconnected from 
religious freedom.  
IV.  PROTECTING RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS AND THEIR MESSAGES
 Under current Establishment Clause interpretation, there is no 
way to maintain an intact religious message in a closed forum. While 
the Court seems to suggest that the messages continue to belong to 
the religious association—as we see from the Allegheny crèche (and 
Justice Souter’s dissent in Van Orden)
184
—those messages are 
unconstitutionally endorsed and so cannot be present on public 
property. The only way the symbolic expression becomes permissibly 
present is if government takes it on and secularizes it,
185
 or if the 
donor group has already secularized it.
186
 184. See supra notes 160-162 and accompanying text. 
 185. See supra notes 163-164 and accompanying text. 
 186. Justice Breyer’s analysis in Van Orden seemed to suggest that the Eagles’ 
message retained its integrity even in closed government space. Of course he speaks of the 
way the monument’s placement among numerous civic and historic objects minimizes its 
religious origins, making it instead a message of the shaping of civic morality.  
  The physical setting of the monument, moreover, suggests little or nothing 
of the sacred. . . . The setting does not readily lend itself to meditation or any 
other religious activity. But it does provide a context of history and moral 
ideas. It (together with the display’s inscription about its origin) communicates 
to visitors that the State sought to reflect moral principles, illustrating a 
relation between ethics and law that the State’s citizens, historically speaking, 
have endorsed.  
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 702 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). But Justice Breyer 
makes much more of the secular and civic identity of the Eagles; then he notes that the 
monument “prominently acknowledge[s] that the Eagles donated the display, a factor 
which, though not sufficient, thereby further distances the State itself from the religious 
aspect of the Commandments’ message.” Id. at 701-02 (emphasis added). Finally, he 
highlights the fact that the wording of the Ten Commandments was a commissioned 
ecumenical effort, not taken from a preexisting religious text. Id. at 701. A secular group, 
clearly identified as the donor, and a text that is a step removed from religious sources, 
taken altogether, make the Eagles’ message a predominantly secular one about civic 
morality in the fight against juvenile delinquency. It seems that Breyer depends heavily on 
the notion that the mediating association has already transformed the message from a 
religious one into a civic one; therefore it is legitimate for the state to appropriate it. In his 
analysis, it very much seems to be the voice of the Eagles that speaks, even though the 
property is not considered a public forum. This seems contrary to the holding of Summum,
which terminates the voice of the donor upon acceptance by the government. See supra
notes 97-102 and accompanying text. For an analysis of these decisions as mixed 
governmental and private speech, see Claudia E. Haupt, Mixed Public-Private Speech and 
the Establishment Clause, 85 TUL. L. REV. 571 (2011) (proposing “an ‘effective control’ 
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 In contrast, theological symbols retain their connection to the 
speaker on private property and in public forums and other 
independent public spaces, where state involvement in expressive 
content is minimal or nonexistent. Protecting such expression is 
critical to ensuring the vitality of religious associations in civil 
society. Indeed, this recognition underlies the development of two 
approaches to “curing” unconstitutional displays that do not require 
removal of the symbol or its secularization: the expansion of the 
public forum and the transfer of public property into private hands. 
The state (through its courts, legislature, or executive) might decide 
that an improper church-state relationship may be or should be 
remedied either by acknowledging or designating the space around 
the symbol to be a public forum or by transferring the symbol and the 
land on which it sits to a private party. In each case, the goal is to 
ensure that the message belongs to the association, and not to the 
government. The transfer—the more recent and controversial 
option—turns the parcel into private property, terminating state 
sponsorship of the symbol as well as any state action; along with 
privatization goes the freedom of expression that attaches to private 
property. Such cures are not specific to these situations; changing the 
scope of public forums and transferring public property to private 
parties are part of the routine activities of government and are either 
inherent in the discretion of government in the management of its 
property or specifically governed by statute and regulations. The 
discussion below first attends to the notion of expanded independent 
spaces, and then to the government transfer of the public property on 
which a symbol sits. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Salazar 
v. Buono addresses this option.
187
 The case involved the congressional 
transfer of federal property to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, as well 
as the cross that sat on that property for seventy years.
188
 While the 
Court is not able to produce a majority holding, its 5-4 judgment 
makes clear that such a transfer can be constitutional.
189
A.  By Locating Symbols in the Public Forum 
 The public forum fits the model of a state committed to a vibrant 
civil society. One of the roles of the limited, activist state is the 
coordination and assistance of organizations in their promotion of the 
common good. Government fulfills this task in part by providing 
public spaces for public discourse and protest. Without controlling 
the content of the conversation, the state manages space for public 
framework to determine Establishment Clause responsibility in cases where public and 
private actors jointly engage in speech”). 
 187. 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010). 
 188. Id. at 1811-12. 
 189. See id. at 1821.  
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conversation and the common good of civil society.
190
 Indeed, criticism 
of public forum doctrine has focused on the ways the doctrine fails 
the common good, specifically on the way in which it gives government 
near total discretion to open, close, and redefine forums.
191
   
 Once a forum is established, however, government can decide to 
accommodate not only transient speech by persons assembled for 
discourse or protest, but temporary “unattended displays” and, where 
space is sufficient, permanent monuments as well.
192
 Furthermore, 
Capitol Square made clear in upholding the Klan’s cross on the plaza 
in front of the Ohio statehouse that religious displays could 
remain in the forum even if the forum was near a seat of 
government.
193
 Though government has tremendous discretion in this 
area, the public forum must be managed in a way that does not 
produce favoritism or sponsorship or prefer one religious message to 
the exclusion of other messages.
194
 Religious groups give voice to their identity and purpose by their 
presence in a public forum, but the experience of symbolic expression 
within a public forum is decidedly different from speaking on one’s 
private property.
195
 No speaker can control the messages of other 
speakers. If there are multiple symbols, they may include some 
which directly challenge a group’s interpretation of its own symbol. 
So a church group might display a crèche but find next to it a sign 
from an atheist group proclaiming “Solstice is the Reason for the 
 190. Streets, sidewalks and public parks have “immemorially been held in trust for the 
use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” Hague v. 
Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
 191. In particular, there is concern that the doctrine has led to an ever-decreasing list 
of spaces open to face-to-face discourse, including proselytizing, protest, and symbolic 
expression. See Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 104; Zick, Property, Place, and 
Public Discourse, supra note 104; Zick, Space, Place, and Speech, supra note 104, at 446 
(arguing that government has moved from “ ‘trustee’ of some significant public properties” 
with public easement for expression to proprietor of public space).  
 192. Cases involve communications affixed to structures like utility poles and 
billboards. For an unfortunate example of a town that decided to close its forum to 
unattended structures specifically to avoid a variety of symbolic messages that might 
compromise aesthetics, see Knights of Columbus, Council #94 v. Town of Lexington, 272 
F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 193. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 797 (1995). 
 194. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text. Public forums can be locations for 
robust private symbolic expression, even when Establishment Clause norms set the outer 
boundaries of participation; however, the public forum approach would not necessarily 
yield robust expression in contexts where Establishment Clause norms might restrict 
religious speech in particularly harsh ways. See Carmella, Religion-Free Environments,
supra note 24, at 97 n.186 (analyzing application of constitutional norms to private 
residential communities). 
 195. Participation in a public forum may be the only way a group speaks publicly and 
symbolically if it has no access to private property.  
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Season.”
196
 Or a group might use a symbol in ways that are offensive 
to others, as when the Klan placed its cross on the plaza. But that 
presented an opportunity for response, as numerous churches came 
together to place crosses on the plaza. Depending upon the policies 
and history of the forum, a religious group might think twice about 
placing its symbol within a public forum. This has not been a 
widespread problem, however, especially since forums are often 
understood to accommodate a variety of speakers over a long period 
of time. Depending upon the location and history of the space, the 
particular policy will create a particular character and reputation; 
time, place, and manner restrictions also help soften jarring 
juxtapositions in the “marketplace of ideas.” But the risk remains 
whenever one speaks in a free society: others may be present to 
counter or confuse the message. This results in each association 
clarifying its own expression.  
 After the 1984 Lynch decision regarding the Pawtucket crèche, it 
became immediately clear that the distinction between public 
property and public forums would be critical. As Justice O’Connor 
has noted, “there is a crucial difference between government speech 
endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and 
private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free 
Exercise Clauses protect.”
197
 In fact, around the time that Lynch was 
decided, the Second Circuit held constitutional the temporary 
presence of a crèche in a park, which the court found to be a 
traditional public forum “available to a broad range of . . . 
nonreligious and religious organizations, groups and persons.”
198
 The 
Supreme Court affirmed that decision by an equally divided vote.
199
In the decade between then and the Court’s 1995 holding in Capitol 
Square, federal district and circuit courts decided numerous cases 
involving religious symbols in public forums. Many existing 
 196. This may result in an unusual collection of symbols. See, e.g., Osediacz v. City of 
Cranston, 414 F.3d 136, 138 (1st Cir. 2005) (declaring the south lawn of city hall as a 
“limited public forum” invited “a large menorah accompanied by a sign conveying wishes 
for ‘a Happy Chanukah’; a near-life size nativity scene; an inflatable seven-foot-tall 
snowman and a similarly sized Santa Claus; a huge holographic angel; a train of fifteen 
pink flamingos with Santa Claus hats; and a sign that read ‘Happy Holidays from the 
Teamsters Union.’ Faced with this embarrassment of riches,” the city “barred further 
entries.”); cf. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Manitowoc Cnty., 708 F. Supp. 2d 773, 
781 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (crèche was constitutional under new policy designating portion of the 
front lawn of county courthouse public forum, but court noted the county may come to 
regret its solution to the problem if “deluged with applications” for displays like those 
in Cranston).  
 197. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990). 
 198. McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716, 727 (2d Cir. 1984), aff’d by equally divided court,
sub nom. Bd. of Trs. v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985). The existence of a disclaimer that 
identified the message as private speech of a private organization was important. 
 199. Bd. of Trs. v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985), aff’g by an equally divided court,
McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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structures, as well as new seasonal symbols like menorahs, were 
found constitutional because the locations were found to be public 
forums.
200
 Such protections continue to today.
201
 These decisions 
remind us that the symbolic expression of the public forum is the 
domain of nonstate groups in civil society—groups with names like 
the Catholic Women’s Club, the Christmas Committee, the Caro 
Women’s Interfaith Committee for Christmas, Chabad Lubavitch, 
and various religious congregations and citizens groups, as well 
as individuals.  
 A more relaxed definition of public forum is in order, especially 
one that responds to spontaneous actions by citizens
202
 and to 
situations in which no government “selective receptivity” has 
occurred. This would recognize “de facto” public forums for these 
types of private expression on public property that is neither a 
traditional nor designated public forum. Since governmental 
promotion or transformation of religious messages is most harmful to 
groups, opportunities to remove these types of state involvement 
make sense for the protection of associational life. But there are 
formidable obstacles to such developments in the public forum 
doctrine, as government jealously guards its power to control and 
manage its property.
203
 Yet it seems that to acknowledge nonstate 
 200. See, e.g., Kreisner v. City of San Diego, 1 F.3d 775, 782 (9th Cir. 1993) (Overtly 
religious display of biblical scenes if “sponsored by the government . . . would violate the 
Establishment Clause. Notwithstanding its strong religious content, however, we conclude 
that because the display is private speech in a traditional public forum removed from the 
seat of government it does not have the primary effect of advancing religion.”); Ams. United 
for Separation of Church & State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1539 (6th Cir. 
1992) (private organization may erect menorah in traditional public forum).  
 201. See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 708 F. Supp. 2d at 775, 776 (New 
policy designating portion of front lawn of county courthouse public forum, its “purpose is 
to allow citizens to have their own displays shown on courthouse grounds without respect 
to the message (religious or otherwise) contained within the display”; crèche (erected by the 
Catholic Women’s Club) found constitutional, as no endorsement of “the group’s religious 
message.”); Satawa v. Bd. of Cnty. Rd Comm’rs, 687 F. Supp. 2d 682 (E.D. Mich. 2009) 
(crèche had to be removed from median for traffic safety, because even if a public forum, 
traffic safety was a compelling governmental interest, even though crèche was displayed 
every Christmas season since 1945); Jocham v. Tuscola Cnty., 239 F. Supp. 2d 714 (E.D. 
Mich. 2003) (county courthouse lawn found to be a public forum, crèche is properly located 
there as private speech of the Caro Women’s Interfaith Committee for Christmas).  
 202. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1818 (2010) (“The goal of avoiding 
governmental endorsement does not require eradication of all religious symbols in the 
public realm. A cross by the side of a public highway marking, for instance, the place where 
a state trooper perished need not be taken as a statement of governmental support for 
sectarian beliefs. The Constitution does not oblige government to avoid any public 
acknowledgment of religion’s role in society.”).  
 203. As we see from Summum, even traditional open forums with respect to transient 
speech may be closed when it comes to structures (like a monument); further, current 
public forum doctrine holds that designated forums can only be created by “purposeful 
government action” in which “the government must intend to make the property ‘generally 
available.’ ” Ark. Ed. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677-78 (1998). “The 
government does not create a [designated] public forum by inaction or by permitting 
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expression outside of the specific confines of public forum doctrine 
would threaten neither the proper roles of the state nor the state’s 
own symbolic expression.
204
 Further, it seems necessary for 
understanding certain cases, like the example of spontaneous private 
expression on public property found in Salazar v. Buono,
205
 described 
immediately below. 
B.  By Transferring Symbols (and the Land on Which They Sit) to 
Private Ownership 
 The transfer to private parties of theological symbols and the 
publicly-owned parcels beneath them (rather than physically moving 
the symbols to private property) has been used in some cases over the 
last fifteen years. At the heart of the remedial transfer option lie two 
concerns: that removing symbols could lead to the kinds of social 
conflict the Establishment Clause was intended to prevent;
206
 and 
that removal itself has a semiotic function, conveying its own 
negative message of rejection, depending upon the history and 
circumstances of the symbol.
207
 These concerns extend more generally 
to the potential destruction of landmark monuments and 
architectural elements that a broad reading of the endorsement test 
could yield, given that many civic symbols adorning public property 
contain biblical images and verses.
208
 Municipalities have begun to use the privatization option to avoid 
costly Establishment Clause litigation. Their goal has been to 
terminate state action so that the symbol is unequivocally private, 
rather than governmental, expression. Nonetheless, suits have been 
filed challenging the transfers themselves. The Seventh Circuit has 
twice upheld transfers, finding that in the absence of evidence of a 
sham transaction, “a sale of real property is an effective way for a 
public body to end its inappropriate endorsement of religion.”
209
 And 
in 2003 Congress used this remedial transfer option, which the 
limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional public forum for public 
discourse.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). 
 204. And it seems that the Court has already done so, at least unwittingly. See supra
notes 158, 185. 
 205. 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010). 
 206. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 207. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1822-23 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 208. Brief of the International Municipal Lawyers Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Petitioner, supra note 15, at 3 (describing the transfer option in Salazar v. Buono as “a 
critical curative mechanism for governmental entities seeking a legitimate option short of 
razing historically significant memorials or displays”).
 209. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (valid transfer of 0.15 acres of city park with statue of Christ terminated the 
endorsement because the exchange involved payment of fair market value and government 
had no duties of ownership); see also Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 
702-04 (7th Cir. 2005) (applying Marshfield to find no endorsement where city transferred 
monument and land to original donor).  
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Supreme Court recently addressed in Salazar v. Buono.
210
 The 
district court opinion, affirmed on appeal, held that the transfer was 
a sham.
211
 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
of unconstitutionality and remanded the case to the district court.
212
While the Court could not agree on a holding, the judgment garnered 
the support of five justices, which implies that such transfers can 
indeed comport with the Establishment Clause. 
Buono involved a cross visible from a highway, on a mountaintop 
known as Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve in 
California. Sunrise Rock is federally owned, although there are some 
pockets of privately owned parcels scattered throughout the 
preserve’s 1.6 million acres.
213
 In 1934, the Veterans of Foreign Wars 
(VFW) erected the cross along with a plaque noting that it was a 
memorial to those who died in World War I.
214
 At the time it was 
common to use a cross to memorialize war dead, and its stark 
whiteness evoked the common image of rows and rows of plain white 
crosses in military cemeteries. In contrast to the more typical 
situation in which a group offers to donate a monument which is then 
accepted and placed on public property, the VFW never sought or 
received permission to place the cross at this location, and the 
National Park Service, the federal agency charged with overseeing 
the preserve, never even acknowledged the symbol’s presence.
215
Maintained over the years by one veteran, and more recently by 
another individual, the cross was actually changed several times. For 
nearly seventy years, the VFW assumed that the symbol was its own 
expression,
216
 much as Chabad thought its menorah on the steps of 
the Allegheny City-County Building was its expression.
217
 Of course 
the VFW had changed the theological meaning of the symbol to a 
patriotic one. As the Eagles had transformed the Ten 
Commandments into a civic symbol of the group’s efforts to combat 
juvenile delinquency,
218
 and the Klan had changed the cross into a 
political and racist symbol,
219
 it is clear that nonstate associations in 
 210. 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010). 
 211. Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
 212. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1820-21. 
 213. Id. at 1811. Boundaries between private and federal land in the preserve “are 
often not marked,” id. at 1822 (Alito, J., concurring), and 10% of the land in the preserve is 
owned either by the state or by private parties. Id. at 1811 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).  
 214. Id. at 1811. 
 215. Id. at 1821-22 (Alito, J., concurring). Nor did it take action to enforce 36 C.F.R. §
2.62(a) (2009) (federal regulation prohibiting religious symbols in national parks). 
 216. See Brief of Amici Curiae Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, et al., 
Supporting Petitioners at 5-6, Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (No. 08-472).  
 217. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.  
 218. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 701 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 219. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., concurring); see also id. at 772 (criticizing Court’s treating cross as religious 
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civil society are free to appropriate symbols for their own purposes 
and use them for their own purposes.
220
 The important difference is 
that the state and its powers are not involved in such redefinition. 
 The private nature of the VFW’s expression would have been 
unequivocally established in 1999 if the federal government had been 
authorized to convert Sunrise Rock into a public forum in response to 
a group’s request to place a Buddhist stupa nearby. But this was not 
possible, and the group was told that the cross would be taken down. 
Since the federal government could not create a public forum by 
allowing the Buddhist stupa, the cross became a single message in 
government-controlled space.
221
 Frank Buono, a retired park service 
employee, sued on establishment grounds, which led to the district 
court’s decision that a reasonable observer would view a cross on 
federal land as governmental endorsement of Christianity. The court 
issued an injunction in 2002.
222
   
 Before the Ninth Circuit affirmed,
223
 Congress enacted a statute 
authorizing the transfer of the cross and the land beneath it to the 
VFW in exchange for land elsewhere in the preserve owned by the 
individual currently maintaining the cross.
224
 The statute provided 
that ownership would revert to the federal government if the 
property was not maintained “as a national memorial 
commemorating United States participation in World War I and 
honoring the American veterans of that war.”
225
 Buono returned to 
the District Court to prevent this transfer through enforcement or 
modification of the 2002 injunction. This time the court held that the 
transfer statute was a sham to preserve the cross at the site, and 
speech and arguing it should have been treated as political speech instead: “The Klan 
simply has appropriated one of the most sacred religious symbols as a symbol of hate.”). 
 220. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. Even secular symbols can be 
appropriated by religious groups and given religious meaning. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. 
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 629 (1943) (Jehovah’s Witnesses treat American flag as a forbidden “graven image”); 
see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (protection of proselytizing includes 
negative statements concerning other faiths). 
 221. See Brief of the American Muslim Armed Forces and Veterans Affairs Council, 
and the Muslim American Veterans Ass’n at 28, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, 
Buono v. Salazar, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (No. 08-472) (“Government did not itself place the 
cross; government allowed private citizens to place the cross and it refused to allow other 
private citizens to place symbols of other faiths. This preferential treatment is a form of 
government sponsorship of the cross. If the government had allowed all faiths to place their 
religious symbols at Sunrise Rock, there would have been a limited public forum instead of 
a government-sponsored cross.” (citation omitted)). Of course the designation of a public 
forum was precluded by federal regulation, see supra note 215. 
 222. Buono v. Norton (Buono I), 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1217 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 223. Buono v. Norton (Buono II), 371 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 224. Congress had acted earlier by designating the cross as a national World War I 
memorial, had authorized restoration of the original cross and explanatory plaque, and had 
forbidden the use of federal funds to remove it. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1813-14. 
 225. Id. at 1813 (quoting Dep’t of Def. Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. 108-87, §§ 
8121(a), 8121(e), 117 Stat. 1100 (2003)).  
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enjoined its implementation,
226
 a decision later affirmed by the Ninth 
Circuit.
227
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
228
 One of the issues before the Supreme Court
229
 was whether the 
injunction against implementation of the land transfer statute was 
proper. (The decision that the cross on federal land violated the 
Establishment Clause had not been appealed and was therefore not 
before the Court.
230
) In a 5-4 vote on the judgment, the Court 
reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings.
231
Only Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts, however, opined 
that the remand was necessary, on the theory that the District Court 
had never engaged in an independent Establishment Clause inquiry 
regarding the transfer.
232
 Justice Kennedy wrote,  
 The 2002 injunction thus presented the Government with a 
dilemma. It could not maintain the cross without violating the 
injunction, but it could not remove the cross without conveying 
disrespect for those the cross was seen as honoring. . . . Deeming 
neither alternative to be satisfactory, Congress enacted the 
[transfer] statute . . . .  
 In belittling the Government’s efforts as an attempt to “evade” 
the injunction, the District Court had things backwards. . . . The 
land-transfer statute embodies Congress’s legislative judgment that 
this dispute is best resolved through a framework and policy of 
accommodation for a symbol that, while challenged under the 
Establishment Clause, has complex meaning beyond the expression 
of religious views. That judgment should not have been dismissed 
as an evasion, for the statute brought about a change of law and a 
congressional statement of policy applicable to the case. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . The court made no inquiry into the effect that knowledge of the 
transfer of the land to private ownership would have had on any 
 226. Buono v. Norton (Buono III), 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2005).  
 227. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc denied,
527 F.3d 758, 760 (2008) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).  
 228. Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009). 
 229. Buono’s standing was also an issue. 
 230. Because the holding on the constitutionality of the cross was not appealed, the 
Court did not opine on this issue. But five justices made it clear that they did not agree 
with the district court’s holding; they were willing to view the cross’s message as one of a 
war memorial. Justice Kennedy wrote that the cross was “intended simply to honor our 
Nation’s fallen soldiers” and that for over seventy years “the cross and the cause it 
commemorated had become entwined in the public consciousness.” Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 
1817. In contrast, several of the remaining justices clearly considered the cross a Christian 
symbol, which does not belong on public property. See id. at 1828 (Stevens, J., dissenting, 
joined by Ginsburg and Sotormayor, JJ.).  
 231. Id. at 1821 (plurality opinion). 
 232. Justice Alito thought the reversal was sufficient, without remand, because enough 
facts were before the Court to decide that the transfer statute was constitutional. Id. at 
1821 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas did not think the plaintiff 
had standing to bring the suit because he had no objection to a cross on private land. Id. at
1824 (Scalia, J., concurring).
532 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:481 
perceived government endorsement of religion, the harm to which 
the 2002 injunction was addressed. The District Court thus used 
an injunction granted for one reason [i.e., the endorsing effect 
of the cross] as the basis for enjoining conduct that was alleged 
to be objectionable for a different reason [i.e., an illicit purpose 
of the transfer]. Ordering relief under such circumstances 
was improper . . . .
233
 Justice Alito’s separate concurrence would not have sent the case 
back for this determination. Believing that there was sufficient 
evidence to reverse the appeals court, Justice Alito thought that 
“[t]he obvious meaning of the injunction was simply that the 
Government could not allow the cross to remain on federal land,”
234
implying that upon transfer the expression ceases to be 
governmental and is once again the VFW’s speech. He was 
particularly concerned with the removal of a longstanding symbol 
and the meaning it signaled: “as a sign of disrespect for the brave 
soldiers whom the cross was meant to honor”; and “as an arresting 
symbol of a Government that is not neutral but hostile on matters of 
religion and . . . bent on eliminating from all public places and 
symbols any trace of our country’s religious heritage.”
235
 Given these 
reasons to justify the transfer, Justice Alito considered Congress’ goal 
in crafting the transfer “to commemorate our Nation’s war dead and 
to avoid the disturbing symbolism that would have been created by 
the destruction of the monument.”
236
 In contrast to these justices who considered deference to the 
transfer appropriate, Justice Stevens found that the district court 
engaged in the appropriate inquiry and properly enforced the 
injunction against the transfer statute, noting that government 
endorsement would continue even after the transfer of title to the 
VFW.
237
 Because he assumed that the cross could not be removed 
 233. Id. at 1817-19 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 234. Id. at 1824 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 235. Id. at 1823. 
 236. Id. at 1824. 
 237. “Government has endorsed the cross, notwithstanding that the name has changed 
on the title to a small patch of underlying land.” Id. at 1832 (Stevens, J., dissenting). “A 
less informed reasonable observer would reach the same conclusion because the cross 
would still appear to stand on Government property.” Id. at 1834 n.4 (internal citation 
omitted). Justice Scalia responds as follows:  
Barring the Government from “permitting” the cross’s display at a particular 
location makes sense only if the Government owns the location. . . . But if the 
land is privately owned, the Government can prevent the cross’s display only by 
making it illegal . . . The principal dissent does not dispute that the original 
injunction did not require the Government to ban the cross’s display on private 
land, yet it insists that the injunction nonetheless forbade transferring the land 
to a private party who could keep the cross in place. But there is no basis in the 
injunction’s text for treating a sale of the land to a private purchaser who does 
not promise to take the cross down as “permitting” the cross’s display, when 
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without forfeiting title—an assumption not shared by other members 
of the Court
238
—he argued that “[t]ransferring the land . . . would 
perpetuate rather than cure that unambiguous endorsement of a 
sectarian message.”
239
  Obviously, we must wait for the district court’s reconsideration on 
remand, the Ninth Circuit’s response to it, and the Supreme Court’s 
substantive determination (if ever) in order to know the exact 
contours of a constitutional transfer.
240
 The analysis should not 
center on the continued maintenance of a symbol but rather on 
ensuring the integrity of the group’s message. To transfer the symbol 
to a religious or civic organization is to allow the group to engage in 
its own symbolic expression with minimal government involvement.  
 From the perspective of government recognizing its semiotic limits 
and acknowledging the proper associations for such expression, the 
transfer to the VFW in my view was wise. In contrast, most of the 
commentary actually calls for an open bidding process precisely to 
ensure an equal opportunity for either preservation or removal of the 
failing to forbid the cross’s presence on already private land within the 
[preserve] would not be treated as such. . . . The principal dissent responds that 
in determining whether the transfer complies with the original injunction we 
“cannot start from a baseline in which the cross has already been transferred.” 
But the effect of transferring the land to a private party free to keep the cross 
standing is identical, so far as the original injunction is concerned, to allowing 
a party who already owned the land to leave the cross in place.  
Id. at 1825 n.2 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
 238. There is dispute over whether the VFW must maintain a cross at the site. The 
opinions of Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Scalia each claim that the transfer did not require 
the cross to be kept in place, noting that only “a war memorial” is required. Justice Scalia 
holds that the VFW might move the cross to another private parcel and substitute a 
different memorial, or might sell the land to someone else who will maintain the cross. 
“The land reverts back to the Government only if ‘the conveyed property is no longer being 
maintained as a war memorial’ . . . .” Id. at 1826 (quoting Dep’t of Def. Appropriations Act, 
2004, Pub. L. 108-87, § 8121(e), 117 Stat. 1100 (2003)). Justice Stevens argues that private 
property becomes the subject of state action because the “purpose of the transfer is to 
preserve its display.” Id. at 1833 (Stevens, J., dissenting). “The cross is . . . not a purely   
‘private’ object in any meaningful sense . . . .” Id. at 1836. “[T]he plurality appears to 
conclude that the transfer might render the cross purely private speech. . . .” Id. Justice 
Stevens goes on to say, 
  I believe that most judges would find it to be a clear Establishment Clause 
violation if Congress had simply directed that a solitary Latin cross be erected 
on the mall in the Nation’s Capital to serve as a World War I Memorial. 
Congress did not erect this cross, but it commanded that the cross remain in 
place, and it gave the cross the imprimatur of Government. Transferring the 
land . . . would perpetuate rather than cure that unambiguous endorsement of 
a sectarian message. 
Id. at 1842. 
 239. Id. at 1842. 
 240. After the Supreme Court decision was issued, the cross was stolen.  
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symbol.
241
 In other words, commentators think that a transfer to the 
highest bidder gives an opportunity to a group to purchase and 
remove the symbol, on the assumption that transfer to the original 
speaker—even for fair consideration—is an illegitimate 
governmental goal. Such a model is unfairly constricting in this case. 
The VFW thought it was symbolically honoring the war dead on 
Sunrise Rock all those many decades. Transfer simply restored its 
chance to speak, on its own terms with symbols of its choice. Of 
course the transfer was not unlimited: a reverter clause made sure 
they would use the property for a war memorial. Like the 
government’s power to close a public forum, the reverter clause 
ensures that private speech is not without constraint.  
 Such a privatizing mechanism should not become a common 
feature of the landscape, but it should be permitted when transfer to 
private organizations for fair market value is more generally 
permitted.
242
 It should never be structured to involve government in 
ongoing maintenance or decisionmaking. And it should be invoked in 
cases in which the preservation of important values is at stake, and 
especially when an alternative burdensome process would yield the 
identical outcome.
243
 To place Buono within my framework of the effects of state 
appropriation and transformation of religious symbols for its own 
use, there is actually little evidence of state appropriation. Because 
there was no donation and acceptance, the spontaneous act of placing 
the cross on Sunrise Rock, and the subsequent lack of involvement by 
government for almost all of the cross’s history, suggests that its 
message remained connected to the VFW. The Court has found that a 
donor group’s message ends abruptly upon the government’s 
acceptance of the monument—at which point it becomes government 
speech.
244
 But in Buono, it seems plausible to think of the 
preservation of the integrity of the group and its message in the face 
of the government’s inattention and inaction, at least until 1999. 
Only between then and 2003, when the transfer to the VFW was 
made, does it make sense to think of the cross as “government 
speech.” In this brief period, the government (according to the Ninth 
Circuit) unconstitutionally endorsed the VFW’s religious message (or, 
one might argue, transformed the VFW’s patriotic message into a 
 241. See, e.g., Jordan C. Budd, Cross Purposes: Remedying the Endorsement of 
Symbolic Religious Speech, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 183 (2004).  
 242. The availability of this mechanism is particularly critical to protecting civic 
symbols (that contain religious elements) that are the target of advocacy groups. See Brief 
of International Municipal Lawyers Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 15, at 3.
 243. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1821 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 244. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text. 
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religious one).
245
 Within my analytical framework, the transfer would 
allow the VFW to express its own message, on its own property.  
V.  CONCLUSION
The jurisprudential developments that encourage the governmental 
adoption and transformation of theologically significant symbols have 
occurred without considering harmful impacts on the symbolic 
expression of mediating associations in civil society. Religious 
associations can become enervated, content to offer their symbolic 
expression to the state, with the consequent loss of unique identity, 
purpose and voice. Without protections to secure the expression of 
those associations on private property and in broadly defined 
independent public spaces, religious freedom is illusory—especially if 
we think that symbols on government property can substitute for it. 
 Just because the state accepts the donation of a religious symbol 
does not mean that the donor groups have been strengthened; nor 
does the presence of this symbol on public property serve as a sign of 
robust religious freedom. I have argued to the contrary in this 
Article, that when government promotes or appropriates the religious 
messages of theologically active groups in civil society, the messages 
are diluted and the groups themselves are compromised, resulting in 
a negative impact on religious freedom. Remedying the situation does 
not necessarily require removal of existing objects or even the refusal 
of offered symbols: the state may redefine the property into a public 
forum (or recognize some other type of independent space) or may 
transfer the parcel of land on which the symbol sits (or will sit) to the 
donor. Such remedies sever the affiliation with the state and with it 
the damaging involvement done to the nonstate actor’s identity, 
purpose, and expression. 
 245. Note, however, that the plurality in Buono clearly thought the government had 
used the cross in the way the VFW intended: as a war memorial, see supra note 230.  
